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ABSTRACT 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF A CHOICE OF ACCOUNTING METHOD 
FOR INVESTMENTS BY COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: 
POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY APPLIED 
IN A NOT-FOR-PROFIT ENVIRONMENT 
Bruce w. Chase 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Major Director: Dr. Edward N. Coffman 
The reasons why managers make certain accounting method 
choices have been explored by accounting researchers for some 
time. For over ten years, much of this research has been 
driven by positive accounting theory, which is based on the 
underlying assumption that managers act rationally to maximize 
their own personal wealth when making accounting method 
choices. This study is an initial attempt to extend positive 
accounting theory research to a not-for-profit setting; 
specifically, the choice of accounting method for endowment 
investments by colleges and universities is examined. 
The three objectives of this study are: 1) to determine 
if the findings of previous research in positive accounting 
theory hold in the college and university industry, 2) to 
determine if other institutional characteristics are 
associated with the accounting method used for endowment 
investments, and 3) to provide information to policymakers 
regarding the accounting for long-term investment by not-for-
profit organizations. 
ix 
Data were obtained from 162 four-year colleges and 
universities. Two regression models were developed to explain 
the variation in the accounting method used for investments. 
The first model contained five variables related to positive 
accounting theory and the second model contained five 
variables related to other institutional characteristics. 
The results of the first model indicate that the choice 
of accounting method for endowment investments is related to 
the factors suggested by positive accounting theory. 
Government regulations and bonus plan provisions factors were 
significant and of the expected sign. The political costs 
factor was also significant but not of the expected sign. The 
debt covenants factor was not significant. 
The results of the second model indicate that the choice 
of accounting method for endowment investments is related to 
other institutional characteristics. Specifically, the model 
found that location, asset allocation in equity investments, 
and the institution's auditor had a statistically significant 
influence on the choice of accounting method. 
The research indicates that there are systematic 
differences in the choice of accounting method for not-for­
profit organizations similar to those explained by positive 
accounting theory for for-profit organizations. Additional 
institutional characteristics were also found to influence 
accounting choice, which warrant further research. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Managers make choices among alternatives in accounting 
methods in preparing external financial statements. The 
reasons why managers make certain accounting method choices 
have been explored by accounting researchers for some time. 
In an early work, Gordon (1964) explored the economic motives 
behind the decisions managers make in selecting accounting 
methods. He concluded that managers select procedures that 
will smooth reported income to satisfy shareholders' 
expectations. His conclusion predated the research connected 
with the efficient market hypothesis. Ball and Brown (1968) 
and others now suggest that annual earnings numbers provide 
little unanticipated information to the market. In contrast, 
Watts (1978) has found quarterly earnings announcements can 
provide information to the market which can produce abnormal 
returns. Also, Ball (1972), Kaplan and Roll (1972), Sunder 
(1973), Hong, Kaplan, and Mandelker (1978), and others suggest 
that the market is efficient and can discern differences 
between earnings numbers that use different accounting 
methods. 
1 
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Watts and Zimmerman (1978) are credited with establishing 
what is called a positive accounting theory that examines 
managers' economic incentives in selecting among accounting 
methods. The theory is based on the underlying assumption 
that managers act rationally to maximize their own personal 
wealth. The theory also considers the contracting and 
monitoring costs associated with the contractual arrangements 
among the interested parties of the organization. Since the 
1978 article, many attempts have been made to empirically test 
positive accounting theory, and these attempts have produced 
several results consistent with the theory; however, there 
have been some inconsistencies in the findings as many of the 
propositions of the theory are difficult to operationalize for 
empirical testing. 
In a recent article, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) discussed 
a ten-year perspective of positive accounting theory. They 
believe that the research has produced many supportive 
findings; however, they feel there are many opportunities to 
improve research undertaken in positive accounting theory. 
Among the specific suggestions to improve the research were 
the need to improve the linkage between the theory and 
empirical tests, and the investigation of intra-industry 
variations in accounting methods. 
One research opportunity is to extend positive accounting 
theory beyond its typical focus on the for-profit business 
community to a not-for-profit environment by examining choice 
of accounting method for endowment investments by colleges and 
3 
universities. This study explores how the findings from 
research on for-profit organizations can be extended to not­
for-profit institutions. 
Institutions of higher education represent a large 
industry group that have many operating objectives different 
from those of corporations; however, managers of colleges and 
universities, like those of for-profit corporations, must 
present financial performance results. In measuring those 
results, managers of colleges and universities must make 
certain accounting method choices. If positive accounting 
theory is robust, then the theory's predictions of management 
behavior should hold in this not-for-profit environment, as in 
the for-profit environment. 
When a theory is applied to a new environment, 
modifications are usually required in research methods. This 
research requires modifications to the variables used in 
previous research. It does, however, provide an opportunity 
to test several aspects of positive accounting theory from a 
different perspective. 
This research provides additional insight into positive 
accounting theory. Furthermore, accounting for investments by 
not-for-profit organizations is likely to be addressed by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as part of the 
financial instruments project [McLaughlin and Farley (1989) ) . 
As part of this project, Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) Number 105 issued in March of 1990 and an 
Exposure Draft issued in December 1990 have been released by 
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the FASB dealing with disclosure of financial instruments. 
Another phase of the FASB project will address recognition and 
measurement issues related to financial instruments. This 
study provides some insight into current practice that should 
be helpful to the FASB in their review related to this phase 
of their project. 
Background 
Colleges and universities may carry endowment investments 
at cost or at fair market value (FMV) in their balance sheet. 
The provision of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
(SFAS) Number 12, "Accounting for Certain Marketable 
Securities," requiring that securities be valued at the lower 
of aggregate cost or market value, does not apply to colleges 
and universities. 
Many colleges and universities have large amounts of 
investments in their endowment funds, thus providing an 
important source of financial support for these institutions. 
For financial reporting purposes, endowment funds are reported 
as a separate fund group. Typically endowment investments 
consist of, in order of concentration, stocks, bonds, cash, 
real estate, and other investment instruments. Investments in 
other fund groups (e.g., current funds and plant funds) are 
usually not significant when compared to endowment holdings; 
thus, the decision as to which accounting procedure to use for 
investments is primarily related to the reporting of endowment 
assets. 
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Peat Marwick Mitchell & Company (1985) (now KPMG Peat 
Marwick) , in a review of accounting practices of 889 colleges 
and universities, found that seventy-eight percent used the 
cost method for valuing investments and sixteen percent used 
the FMV method. The remaining six percent indicated the use 
of some other method. 
Financial results reported using the cost method may be 
quite different from those using the FMV method. Under both 
methods, the financial statements will reflect income from 
investments and gains and losses from investment transactions. 
The difference is that under the FMV method, unrealized gains 
and losses will also be reflected. The change in market value 
for investments held on the report date will be reflected in 
the unrealized amount. 
Managers employing the cost method of accounting can 
influence the reported numbers by deciding the timing of 
certain investment transactions. If management wishes to 
report lower profits, investments that have appreciated in 
value can be held and investments that have declined in value 
can be sold. On the other hand, under the FMV method of 
accounting all changes in market value would be reflected in 
the financial statements. 
The Peat Marwick Mitchell & Company study also revealed 
that many colleges and universities did not disclose complete 
investment performance results. The study found that of those 
institutions using the cost method of accounting for 
investments, seventy-one percent of the public institutions 
6 
and thirty percent of the private institutions did not 
disclose market value data in the financial statements. In 
addition, eighty-one percent of the respondents surveyed did 
not disclose the investment portfolio performance in the notes 
to the financial statements. 
Because of the lack of disclosure, readers of the 
financial statements, in many cases, will be unable to 
accurately compare performance results between institutions. 
The typical readers of college and university financial 
statements include governing boards, governmental 
organizations, creditors, donors, foundations, and employees. 
The accounting method used for endowment investments may 
impact the way the user of the financial statements interprets 
an institution's investment performance. 
For several reasons, the choice of accounting method for 
endowment investments provides different research 
opportunities to empirically test positive accounting theory. 
1) This study provides a not-for-profit setting for this 
research. 2) It considers accounting valuation method in only 
the college and university industry. Intra-industry studies 
allow for better control over extraneous variables that often 
arise due to differences among industries. 3) Reported 
numbers in a business setting represent the combination of 
several different accounting method choices. Because managers 
in a business setting make accounting method choice decisions 
from a portfolio of alternatives, the effect of one decision 
may be difficult to evaluate. Endowment returns are reported 
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as a separate fund and, therefore, the effects of an 
accounting valuation method choice can be isolated from other 
endogenous variables. 4) This study also provides an 
opportunity to examine a choice of accounting method that 
impacts a key financial performance indicator, investment 
performance. 
Objectives of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship 
between a choice of accounting method in a college and 
university environment and managers' 
suggested by positive accounting theory. 
self-interest as 
Specifically, the 
objectives of this research can be stated as follows: 
1. To determine if the findings of previous research 
in positive accounting theory hold true for the 
choice of accounting by not-for-profit colleges and 
universities. Previous research in positive 
accounting theory has concentrated on the influence 
of several factors on a manager's self-interest in 
a business environment, 
regulations, political 
specifically, government 
actions, bonus plan 
provisions, and debt covenants. The study will 
not-for-profit examine these factors in a 
environment. 
2. To determine if certain other institutional 
characteristics are associated with the choice of 
accounting method used for endowment investments. 
3. To provide policymakers information regarding the 
accounting for long-term investment by not-for­
profit organizations. 
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This study represents an initial effort to apply positive 
accounting theory research methodology to a not-for-profit 
setting and therefore, adds another dimension to the positive 
accounting theory literature. 
Statement of Problem and Hypotheses 
Positive accounting theory had its beginning in 
contracting and agency theory. Contracting theory assumes 
that contracts are used by the various factors of production 
within an organization. Individuals within the organization 
are motivated by self-interest and these contracts are 
necessary to minimize the cost from shirking and to reduce the 
conflict of interest among the various parties. Agency theory 
examines the relationship between a principal and agent in an 
organization. Assuming rational expectations, the principal 
will reduce the price (price protect) paid the agent for 
anticipated non-optimal behavior of the agent. The agent 
bears these costs and may contract with the principal not to 
take these non-optimal actions. Similarly, the agent may 
incur monitoring costs to demonstrate to the principal that 
these contracts are being followed. 
Positive accounting theory considers a broad range of 
contracting costs. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) use the term 
contracting costs to include transaction, agency, information, 
renegotiation, and bankruptcy costs, and consider these costs 
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on both the internal parties of a firm and the external 
parties, such as suppliers, claim holders, and customers. 
Accounting information is used in many of these contracts and 
plays an important role in the systems used to measure, 
reward, and punish management's performance. The effect of a 
choice of accounting method on each contracting party's wealth 
depends on the relative magnitudes of the contracting costs. 
When managers have discretion over the reporting of 
accounting numbers, they are motivated to take action that 
either increases the wealth of all contracting parties or 
increases their own wealth at the expense of some other party 
or parties. Contracts are often used to limit the amount of 
discretion that managers have over reported numbers; however, 
some discretion usually exists to allow the manager 
flexibility in maximizing the value of the firm. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) refer to this discretion as the "accepted 
set" of accounting procedures, which will vary across firms 
and industries. 
The contracting parties may price protect themselves from 
opportunistic behavior by the manager within the "accepted 
set" of accounting procedures, but this will not prevent the 
manager from taking such actions. Managers are constrained by 
contracts and their opportunistic behavior within these 
constraints will depend on the relative effects of the various 
contracting costs. 
Positive accounting theory assumes that managers act 
rationally and seek to maximize their own personal wealth. 
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Personal wealth can be seen as a function of current and 
future compensation. Components of current compensation 
include salary, cash incentives, and stock bonus plans. 
Future compensation includes increased value in stock holdings 
and managerial human resources. Fama (1980) suggested that 
the labor market acts to set the value for managerial human 
resources. If managers are able to improve a firm's value, 
then the labor market will reward such actions with higher 
future compensation. 
In a college and university environment, it may be 
contended that managers may be less motivated by personal 
wealth considerations than in for-profit organizations. Large 
salaries and cash incentives and stock bonus plans are not 
part of the normal compensation package of managers of 
colleges and universities. Managers may be motivated by other 
factors. For instance, it can be contended that these 
managers are motivated by their concern for the institution 
and its ability to meet its mission. These other �otives, 
however, may be consistent with wealth maximization of the 
manager. It appears reasonable to assume that the more 
successful and prestigious an institution becomes, the more 
its managers will be paid and the more its managers will be 
demanded by other institutions, much the same way an increase 
in market value affects managers of for-profit institutions. 
In business, managers can increase their wealth by taking 
actions to either improve their compensation (salary or bonus 
plan) or enhance market value of the firm (which increases 
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their managerial human resources and the value of their stocks 
or options). Managers of colleges and universities can 
increase their wealth primarily through increases in salary 
and managerial human resources. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
suggest that a number of factors can influence a manager's 
wealth, specifically, government regulations, political 
actions, bonus plan provisions, and debt covenants. These 
factors can affect the market value of a firm and management 
compensation directly. 
A firm's reported earnings can have an impact on all of 
the factors suggested by Watts and Zimmerman. Different 
accounting methods will produce different reported earnings. 
Some accounting methods will produce lower earnings, while 
others will have the opposite effect. For college and 
university endowment investments, the fair market value method 
will generally produce higher earnings and assets values than 
the cost method. This is especially true in a rising stock 
market, which the United states has experienced for four of 
the last five years ending June 30, 1989 (measured by the 
Standard and Poor's 500 index). 
If managers act rationally, they will select a set of 
accounting procedures that will report earnings that maximize 
their wealth. There is no reason to believe that managers of 
not-for-profit organizations would act differently. 
Understanding how reported earnings interact with the above 
factors will give insight into why managers select accounting 
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procedures that either increase or decrease reported income. 
Each of these factors will be discussed below. 
Government Regulations 
Government regulations may impose costs on an 
organization; managers of course would want to avoid such 
costs. Accounting numbers are sometimes used by regulators in 
establishing policy; for example, most utilities are subject 
to rate of return regulations based on reported accounting 
earnings. Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Deakin (1989), and Wong 
(1988) found evidence to indicate that firms facing regulation 
preferred accounting procedures that reduced reported 
earnings. 
Colleges and universities may also be subject to 
government regulations. For example, public colleges receive 
a significant amount of their financial support from state 
appropriations. In the appropriation process, legislators 
often face resource allocation decisions among needs from many 
different types of organizations. If an organization receives 
a significant amount of support from outside the state 1 s 
appropriation, such as from an endowment, it appears 
reasonable to assume that state legislators might consider 
this other support in making their resource allocation 
decisions. The existence of the possibility of reduction in 
state funding may be one of the reasons that many public 
colleges and universities use outside foundations to hold 
endowment funds. Peat Marwick Mitchell & Company (1985) found 
that for the colleges and universities surveyed, thirty-two 
13 
percent of the public institutions had fund raising 
foundations compared to only six percent of the private 
institutions. It would then appear to be in the best interest 
of public colleges to report lower endowment returns and asset 
values. Private institutions would not be affected by the 
state legislative process and would not have the same 
incentive to report lower endowment returns. 
The cost method of accounting for endowments would 
provide managers with flexibility to report lower asset values 
and earnings. As described ear 1 ier, under the cost method the 
financial statements would reflect asset values at cost and 
only realized gains and losses would be reported. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
Hl: Public institutions are more likely 
to use cost method accounting for 
endowment investments than are private 
institutions. 
This not-for-profit setting provides a new approach to 
test the influence of government regulations on a choice of 
accounting method. The public versus private comparison 
should provide additional support for the contention that 
government regulations may influence a choice of accounting 
method. 
Political Actions 
Managers need to be aware of the costs that the political 
process may impose on their organizations. In a for-profit 
setting, increased taxes and antitrust actions are two 
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possible political actions that would increase costs to an 
organization. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggested that 
reported earnings influence the threat of political actions. 
Firms earning higher than normal returns may be more 
susceptible to review by the political process. 
Many factors can influence a firm's political costs 
exposure. Size and industry characteristics are some of the 
factors that have been investigated. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978), Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981), Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey (1981), Daley and Vigeland 
(1983), Ayres (1986), and Wong (1988) all found support for 
the size hypothesis. In addition, Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey 
(1981) and Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) found support for 
certain industry characteristics. 
Colleges and universities may also be susceptible to 
political costs. For example, a recent article by Jaschik 
(1990) describes the year-long Justice Department's antitrust 
investigation of several prestigious institutions that were 
sharing students' financial aid and other information. 
Another example of political costs is related to taxes. 
Currently, colleges and universities are tax exempt; however, 
several times in the past Congress has discussed the concept 
of a tax on endowment earnings. In his annual address to the 
National Association of College and University Business 
Officers (NACUBO), Caspa Harris, president of NACUBO, 
discussed the possibility of Congress imposing a tax on 
endowment earnings (Harris (1990]). 
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As stated above, size has been used in many previous 
studies to suggest political costs exposure. It seems 
reasonable to assume that size may also be relevant in the 
not-for-profit setting. One measurement of size is the asset 
value of the endowment fund. Most prestigious, highly visible 
institutions have significant endowment funds; this may 
increase their exposure to political costs since an endowment 
tax would likely have a greater impact on institutions with 
larger endowment holdings. 
Reporting lower asset values and returns in financial 
statements may reduce the threat of political action. Again, 
the cost method would provide management with more flexibility 
to accomplish this goal. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Institutions with larger endowment 
holdings are more likely to use cost 
method accounting for endowment 
investments than are institutions with 
smaller endowment holdings. 
Another measurement of size for colleges and universities 
is full-time equivalent students (FTE). Dividing the 
endowment by the number of FTE would yield endowment-per-FTE. 
It seems reasonable to assume that institutions with a large 
endowment-per-FTE would have more political exposure than 
institutions with a smaller endowment-per-FTE. These 
institutions would normally generate more funds per students 
from the endowment and therefore are more visible. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Institutions with larger endowment­
per-FTE are more likely to use cost 
method accounting for endowment 
investments than are institutions with 
smaller endowment-per-FTE. 
Bonus Plan Provisions 
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Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggested that a manager's 
choice of accounting method may be influenced by the existence 
of an earnings-based compensation bonus plan. Managers who 
have such plans are more likely to select accounting 
procedures that will increase reported earnings, as such 
increases will enhance their compensation and wealth. Several 
tests of this proposition have been made. Zmijewski and 
Hagerman (1981), Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1982), Healy 
(1985), Ayres (1986), and Deakin (1989) all found evidence 
that management bonus compensation plans, in certain 
instances, are positively correlated to accounting methods 
that increase reported earnings. 
The use of bonus compensation plans for college and 
university managers is not an orthodox practice; thus, a 
direct test of the influence of bonus plans on a choice of 
accounting method is not possible in this setting. However, 
even in the absence of a formal incentive compensation plan, 
managers' salaries can still be affected by the level of 
earnings in an organization. If above-average earnings are 
achieved over time, managers will be able to justify requests 
for higher salaries. The higher earnings will also increase 
managers' human resource capital. On the other hand, managers 
who consistently produce poor returns may face termination. 
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It seems reasonable to expect that managers would want to 
avoid reporting lower earnings. Trombley (1989) and Ayres 
(1986) found that managers of firms that experienced a decline 
or had a relatively smaller percent increase in earnings were 
more likely to elect early adoption of an income increasing 
accounting method. 
Colleges and universities senior managers' performance 
evaluations and compensations are likely influenced by 
variables other than reported revenues and expenditures; 
however, endowment holdings can significantly impact the 
institution, and therefore the investing of these funds can be 
an important part of managers' responsibilities. Investment 
return is often seen as a good measure of management 
performance; thus, investment return may become a part of 
managers' performance evaluations. In addition, compensation 
for some lower level managers may be more directly linked to 
endowment earnings performance. 
As described earlier, the cost method would allow 
managers more flexibility in recognizing investment gains and 
losses. While this flexibility may appeal to many managers, 
its effects would be more significant for managers who 
consistently produce marginal or poor investment returns. 
Managers consistently producing good investments results would 
benefit from using the FMV method. The financial statements 
under the FMV method would reflect this performance, and the 
manager would not have to be concerned with the timing of 
transactions. 
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A common measure of investment performance is a "total 
return" calculation, computed by adding income from the 
investments to any change in market value for the period and 
dividing the sum by the beginning market value. This measure 
is computed independently of the accounting method employed 
for endowment investments and thus can be used to compare 
performance among organizations. 
The following hypothesis is based on this line of 
reasoning: 
H4: Institutions with lower investment 
total returns are more likely to use cost 
method accounting for endowment 
investments than are institutions with 
higher investment total returns. 
The above hypothesis provides an indirect test of the 
bonus plan hypothesis. Managers with lower investment results 
have compensation incentives to elect an accounting method 
that provides flexibility in reporting results. 
Debt covenants 
The existence of a potential conflict between the owners 
of a company and its bondholders has been addressed in the 
literature by Jensen and Meckling (1976), among others. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) and Smith and Warner (1979) suggested 
that managers can take certain actions that will transfer 
wealth from the bondholders to the owners of a company. 
Because of this conflict, bond covenants are used to protect 
bondholders by reducing management's ability to affect such 
changes. 
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Many debt covenants are based upon financial variables 
computed from the financial statements. Thus, a choice of 
accounting method by management can have an effect on bond 
covenant constraints. Managers may be less constrained by 
certain bond covenants by selecting accounting methods that 
increase reported income. For example, covenants based on 
debt-to-equity ratio and interest coverage ratio will be less 
restrictive as earnings increase. 
In an early work, Dhaliwal (1980) suggested that the 
simple debt-to-equity ratio could be used to predict which 
firms would use accounting methods that increased earnings. 
Firms with larger debt-to-equity ratios would prefer 
accounting methods that increased earnings. Since the 1980 
study, there have been many empirical tests related to a 
firm's debt structure and choice of accounting method. 
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) found support for the debt-to­
equity ratio hypothesis. In addition, other studies have 
looked at the restrictive debt covenants and their 
relationship to choice of accounting method. Bowen, Noreen, 
and Lacey (1981), Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1982), Daley 
and Vigeland (1983), Ayres (1986), Wong (1988), Trombley 
(1989), and Deakin (1989) all found evidence that certain 
restrictive covenants were associated with procedures that 
increase earnings. 
Colleges and universities often depend on their endowment 
assets holdings to demonstrate financial health. A debt-to­
endowment asset holdings ratio is one measure used by lending 
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institutions to determine debt capacity. Endowment assets 
holdings are usually made up of high grade investment 
instruments that provide a steady source of income to an 
institution. The debt-to-endowment assets ratio may be 
comparable to the debt-to-equity ratio used in other studies. 
Institutions that use FMV accounting for investments will 
normally report higher asset values in the endowment fund than 
would be reported under the cost method. Based on research 
done in the for-profit environment, it would appear that 
colleges and universities with larger debt-to-endowment assets 
ratios would prefer accounting methods that report larger 
asset values. The following hypothesis is based on this 
reasoning: 
HS: Institutions with larger debt-to­
endowment assets ratios are more likely 
to use FMV method accounting for 
endowment investments than are 
institutions with lower debt-to-endowment 
assets ratios. 
The above hypothesis modifies the debt-to-equity 
variables used in previous research to test the debt covenants 
hypothesis. The variable used, debt-to-endowment assets, 
serves as a proxy for the constraints of bond covenants. 
Other Characteristics 
In addition to the factors indicated above, there may be 
others that influence a manager's choice of accounting method 
for endowment investments. The author discussed this study 
with nine representatives of colleges and universities, 
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including a college president, a higher education consultant, 
a representative from the National Association of College and 
University Business Officers (NACUBO), and six chief business 
officers. Based on these discussions, the following 
institutional characteristics have been added as variables to 
the study: auditor, percent of endowment in equities, percent 
of endowment in real estate, spending rate formula, and 
location of the institution. The following hypotheses are 
based on the variables identified above: 
H6-HlO: C e r t a i n  o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
characteristics, represented by the variables 
auditor, percent of endowment in equities, percent 
of endowment in real estate, spending rate formula, 
and location, respectively, have a influence on the 
choice of accounting method for endowment 
investments. 
Summary of Objectives and Hypotheses 
As described earlier, this study has three objectives. 
Table 1.1 summaries the specific hypotheses and variables 
developed for the first two objectives. These two objectives 
have a common purpose: to determine if certain institutional 
characteristics are related to the accounting method used for 
endowment investments. The findings from the data analysis 
for the first two objectives will provide information to 
policymakers regarding accounting for long-term investments by 
not-for-profit organizations; satisfying the third objective. 
Description of Chapter Divisions 
Chapter 1 consists of the introduction, background, 
objectives of the study, the statement of the problem and 
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hypotheses and a summary of objectives and hypotheses. 
Chapter 2 is a review of the major studies in positive 
accounting theory. It also describes the relationship of 
previous studies to the present study. Chapter 3 consists of 
a description of the sample design and the statistical methods 
used. Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis of the 
data. Chapter 5 presents the summary, conclusions, and 
limitations of the study, as well as recommendations for 
future study. 
TABLE 1.1 
SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
Objective One 
H1: 
H2: 
H3: 
H4: 
H5: 
Objective Two 
H6: 
H7: 
HS: 
H9: 
H10: 
Relationship between the variables 
related to positive accounting theory 
and the choice of accounting method 
for endowment investments 
Government regulations (type of 
institution) 
Political actions (size of endowment) 
Political actions (size of endowment­
per-FTE) 
Bonus plan provisions (total return 
on endowment) 
Debt covenants (debt-to-endowment 
assets ratio) 
Relationship between certain other 
institutional characteristics and the 
choice of accounting method for 
endowment investments 
Institutional auditor 
Percent of endowment in equities 
Percent of endowment in real estate 
Spending rate formula 
Location 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the major studies in positive 
accounting theory and thus provides a summary of the various 
approaches, procedures, and findings of this research 
paradigm. The positive accounting theory research paradigm 
was promoted by Watts and Zimmerman in 1978 and has since 
dominated the literature regarding choice of accounting 
method. The research in this area is primarily of two types; 
the first is concerned with management's voluntary choice of 
accounting method, and the second is focused upon management's 
reaction to proposed mandated accounting changes. 
Studies are presented in chronological order of 
publication since many of the studies build upon the findings 
of earlier research. A summary of this literature review is 
presented in Table 3.1 at the end of this chapter. 
Watts and Zimmerman Study 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) are credited with establishing 
the positive accounting theory research paradigm. They 
investigated the reasons why a corporate manager chose to 
either support or oppose a proposed accounting standard. 
Specifically, their research focused on firms that submitted 
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written comments to a 1974 FASB Discussion Memorandum, 
"Reporting the Effects of General Price-Level Changes in 
Financial Statements" (GPLA). 
The Watts and Zimmerman study is based on the premise 
that managers seek to maximize their own wealth, and this 
wealth can be affected by the following factors: taxes, 
regulations, political costs, 
management compensation plans. 
information costs, and 
They proposed that political 
and regulation costs will dominate other factors. In other 
words, when a firm is subject to political pressure or 
regulation, managers will prefer accounting standards that 
report lower earnings; the political and regulatory 
considerations will outweigh any gain in incentive 
compensation. 
Watts and Zimmerman used size as a proxy for political 
costs. They assumed the larger a firm, the more likely its 
managers will select accounting procedures that will reduce 
income. Their model incorporated size, industry· concen­
tration, bonus compensation, taxes, and regulation. 
They sampled fifty-three firms that filed written 
comments to the Discussion Memorandum on GPLA, of which 
thirty-four opposed and eighteen supported the proposed 
accounting change (for one firm an opinion could not be 
determined) . Their study required an estimate of the effects 
of GPLA on earnings. For the unregulated firms, twenty-six 
had lower earnings estimates and eight had higher estimates. 
Regulated firms were excluded from the initial test because it 
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was unclear how regulatory commissions would treat GPLA gains 
and losses. 
Watts and Zimmerman predicted that managers' positions on 
the Discussion Memorandum were related to both size and the 
effect of the proposed regulation on earnings. Using a Mann­
Whitney U-test, they found support for their hypothesis. 
Large firms whose earnings would be reduced favored the 
proposal. A discriminant analysis was then done based on 
bonus compensation plans, direct regulation, industry 
concentration, tax effect, and size. Firm size emerged as the 
dominant factor in predicting managers' preference. 
Two major concerns with this study are the use of size as 
a proxy for political costs and the number of firms from the 
oil industry in the sample. Size could serve as a proxy for 
many other variables in addition to political costs. Also, 
many of the firms in the sample were from the oil industry, 
which, at the time of the study in 1974, was under close 
scrutiny by Congress and the public. The effects of the above 
concerns on the results are difficult to estimate. 
Hagerman and Zmijewski Study 
Hagerman and Zmijewski {1979) extended the research done 
by Watts and Zimmerman to choice of accounting method for four 
different areas. This study used the choice of accounting 
method for inventory (LIFO versus FIFO), depreciation 
(accelerated versus straight line), investment tax credit 
(flow through versus deferral), and the amortization of past 
service costs for pensions. The authors suggested that the 
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following factors influence a manager's choice of accounting 
method: political costs (size), industry concentration (sales 
of the eight largest firms/total industry sales), risk (beta 
coefficient), capital intensity (gross fixed assets/sales), 
and incentive compensation plans. They proposed that firms 
favoring methods that decrease income would be larger, 
riskier, more capital intensive, and part of a highly 
concentrated industry. Firms with incentive compensation 
plans would favor accounting methods that increase income. 
Hagerman and Zmijewski sampled 300 randomly selected 
firms from 1975 that disclosed their choice of accounting 
methods. A multivariate procedure, probit, was used to 
determine the significance of variables for each of the four 
accounting method choices. 
The results of probit analysis indicated that the model 
was significant only for the depreciation and inventory method 
choices. For the depreciation choice, risk and size were 
significant at the 0.05 level, and capital intensity and size 
were significant at the 0.10 level. The other variables were 
not significant. For the inventory choice, only two variables 
were significant at the 0.10 level, capital intensity and 
industry concentration. 
As indicated, the Hagerman and Zmijewski study extended 
positive accounting theory to the selection of accounting 
methods for four different areas. The results, however, 
indicated that managers may be influenced by different factors 
for each choice of accounting method, which was troubling to 
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the authors. Two years later, they extended this research in 
an attempt to address this concern (Zmijewski and Hagerman 
[1981]). 
Dhaliwal Study 
Dhaliwal (1980) explored the concept of how a firm's 
leverage could influence a manager's preference in a choice of 
accounting method. He proposed that a highly leveraged firm 
would avoid accounting methods that either reduced or 
increased volatility in earnings, because highly leveraged 
firms want to avoid possible costly renegotiation or technical 
default on their loan agreement due to lower earnings. 
The study examined firms engaged in oil and gas 
exploration in 1976. At that time, firms could account for 
exploration expense using either a "full cost" method or a 
"successful effort" method. It is likely that the "full cost" 
method would produce higher earnings because all exploration 
costs would be amortized. It was hypothesized that highly 
leveraged firms would be more likely to use the "full cost" 
method to account for exploration expense. 
Dhaliwal selected firms that used the "full cost" method 
and then matched these firms, by sales revenue, with firms 
that used the "successful effort" method, to control for the 
size effect identified in the Watts and Zimmerman ( 1978) 
study. A sample of thirty-three matched pairs of firms was 
obtained. Using a matched-pair "t" test, the debt-to-equity 
ratio was compared for the two groups. The difference in the 
debt-to-equity ratios was statistically significant at the 
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0.09 level. Dhaliwal expanded positive accounting theory to 
include the influence of debt contracts. Although the study 
did not examine the actual debt contract covenants, it 
provided support for the influence of leverage on the choice 
of accounting method. 
Zmijewski and Hagerman Study 
In this study, Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) re-examined 
their previous research (Hagerman and Zmijewski [1979]). In 
the 1979 study, they examined the influence of political 
costs, industry concentration, risk, capital intensity, and 
incentive compensation plans on a manager's choice of 
accounting method. In this study, the debt-to-equity factor 
identified in the Dhaliwal (1980) study was also examined. 
The four accounting method choices studied were inventory, 
depreciation, investment tax credit, and the amortization of 
past service costs for pensions. 
In this study, they proposed that managers do not make 
decisions regarding choice of accounting methods 
independently; rather managers make such decisions as part of 
an overall financial reporting strategy. Managers act to 
achieve a long-term optimal income strategy. 
Zmijewski and Hagerman developed a model that 
incorporated all four accounting method choices as part of an 
overall income strategy. Their study allowed for only two 
possible choices (either income increasing or income 
decreasing) for each choice of accounting method, which 
produced sixteen possible combinations. An individual company 
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could be at an extreme position by using all income increasing 
or decreasing methods, or the company can be somewhere between 
the two extreme positions. The authors further proposed three 
different variations of the model as follows: 
1) Five-strategy model. All four accounting 
methods were assumed to impact earnings 
equally. For example, one extreme would 
be for all four choices to be income 
increasing. 
2) Seven-strategy model. Pension costs and 
investment tax credit methods were 
assumed to have one-half the impact of 
depreciation and inventory methods. 
3) Nine-strategy model. Pension costs and 
investment tax credit methods were 
assumed to have equal but less than one­
half the impact of depreciation and 
inventory methods. 
Zmijewski and Hagerman used the sample of 300 companies 
from their 1979 study plus the sample of thirty-four 
unregulated firms from the Watts and Zimmerman (1978) study. 
They compared the two groups and found that the firms in the 
Watts and Zimmerman sample were more likely to have an extreme 
income strategy. They considered this support for their 
notion that managers would be more likely to lobby on a 
proposed accounting change if they could not adjust their 
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income strategy to offset the change (e.g., they are already 
at an extreme position). 
The authors used a probit analysis to test their 
hypothesis using a naive prediction that assumed an equal 
probability for each strategy. All three versions of the 
model were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. When 
this assumption was changed to a naive assumption that the 
firms used the strategy most commonly employed, the level of 
significance dropped to the 0.25 level. 
Not all the independent variables were significant. For 
all three models, size was significant at the 0.01 level and 
industry concentration and incentive compensation were 
significant at the 0. 05 level. Debt-to-equity was significant 
at the 0.10 level for the five-strategy model and at the 0.05 
level for the other two models. Risk and capital intensity 
were not significant. 
Zmijewski and Hagerman performed additional tests related 
to size. They divided the sample of firms into large and 
small firm subgroups. The model proved significant for the 
large group. They concluded that the model may not be 
appropriate for all types of organizations and there may exist 
a size threshold for their model. 
In summary, this study demonstrated the merits of not 
considering a choice of accounting method in isolation. The 
findings indicated that managers make accounting method 
choices as part of an overall income strategy. Also, 
management compensation plans were shown to be significant in 
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this model. The main limitation of this study was that the 
model used a naive assumption of equal probability for each 
strategy. When this assumption was changed to the most 
commonly used strategy, the model did not perform well. 
Bowen. Noreen. and Lacey Study 
The study by Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey (1981) examined the 
choice by managers to capitalize or expense interest on assets 
not yet in service. Their study concentrated on the influence 
of debt contract constraints and political costs on a 
manager's choice of accounting method. They identified three 
variables related to debt contracts: 1) dividends 
paid/unrestricted retained earnings, 2) incomejinterest 
expense, and 3) net tangible assets/long-term debt. Political 
costs were examined by using a size variable and testing its 
significance within a politically sensitive industry (oil and 
gas) and then for all other industries. This study also 
incorporated a variable for the existence of a bonus 
compensation plan. 
The authors selected firms from 1974 that capitalized 
interest and randomly matched these firms to non-capitalizing 
firms within the same industry. A sample of ninety-one 
matched pairs of firms was achieved. The authors hypothesized 
that firms would more likely select income reducing accounting 
procedures (non-capitalize) if they faced political costs, and 
select income increasing procedures (capitalize) for bonus 
compensation and debt contract reasons. 
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The study used "t" tests and multivariate probit 
analysis. For the "t" tests, the debt contract variables were 
all significant and bonus compensation was not. Size within 
the oil and gas industry was significant, and there was also 
evidence of a "threshold effect" similar to that found by 
Zmijewski and Hagerman ( 1981). Outside the oil and gas 
industry, the size effect had the opposite sign and was also 
significant. No explanation was offered for this unexpected 
finding. The probit analysis supported the findings of the 
"t" tests. 
In summary, this study introduced more refined leverage 
variables and controlled for industry effect. The study also 
found an unexpected opposite effect for size outside the oil 
and gas industry. 
Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith Study 
The Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1982) study examined 
the relationship between the ownership control and the choice 
of depreciation methods for financial reporting. The authors 
hypothesized that firms that were controlled more by 
management (MC) would prefer income increasing accounting 
methods. Managers of such firms would want to keep current 
shareholders satisfied, reduce takeover threats, and maximize 
their bonus incentive plans. Closely held firms, referred to 
as owner controlled (OC), would have less incentive to report 
higher earnings. The authors proposed that OC firms were less 
likely to use bonus compensation plans and might wish to 
report lower earnings for labor negotiating reasons. 
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Dhaliwal et al. defined OC firms as having one party 
owning ten percent or more of the voting stock with membership 
on the board of directors, or one party owning twenty percent 
of the voting stock. MC firms were defined as no party owning 
more than five percent of the voting stock. A random sample 
of forty-two MC and forty-one OC firms was selected from 1962 
for this study. Based on previous work, additional variables 
were added to control for size and debt-to-equity ratio. 
The multivariate probit model was significant at the 0.01 
level. The independent variables, control (0.03 level), debt­
to-equity (0.01 level), and size (0.15 level) were all 
significant. 
In summary, this study provided support for the control 
and debt-to-equity hypotheses and to a lesser degree for size. 
If MC firms are more likely to have bonus compensation plans, 
the results would also support the bonus plan hypothesis. The 
authors believed that this study also provided support against 
the theory suggested by Fama (1980), which proposed no 
difference between managers of MC and OC firms because of the 
efficient labor market. 
Daley and Vigeland Study 
The study by Daley and Vigeland (1983) examined the 
choice by managers to capitalize or expense research and 
development (R&D) costs. Their study, like Bowen et al. 
(1981), concentrated on the influence of debt contract 
constraints and political cost. They used variables from 
previous studies for debt contracts (i.e., interest coverage 
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and dividends to unrestricted retained earnings). Based on 
the assumption that public debt would be more costly to 
renegotiate, the authors divided the leverage ratio into 
public and non-public ratios. Political cost was examined by 
using a size variable. 
From 1974, the authors randomly selected 135 firms that 
capitalized R&D costs and 178 firms that expensed these costs. 
They hypothesized that firms would more likely select an 
income increasing accounting method (capitalize R&D costs) if 
they were closer to debt constraints, had more public debt, or 
were smaller in size. 
Using a Mann-Whitney 
variables were significant 
u-test, 
at the 
all 
0.01 
the independent 
level with the 
exception of dividend to unrestricted retained earnings. The 
authors discussed the merits of three different multivariate 
tests: probit, logit, and a jackknife procedure that used 
ordinary least squares. The jackknife approach was used 
because it required less restrictive assumptions (the authors 
reported that the three methods produced similar results). 
The multivariate model was significant at the 0.01 level with 
all independent variables being significant except interest 
coverage. 
The authors also performed certain sensitivity analyses 
of their model. Of particular interest were the findings 
related to size. Previous studies had found that the effects 
of size were more important in explaining choice of accounting 
method for large firms. When the firms were partitioned into 
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large and small firm subgroups, size was only significant for 
the small firms. This suggested that the effect of size is 
not clearly understood. 
In summary, this study expanded the research done on the 
influence of leverage by adding a variable to reflect public 
versus private debt. It also produced a result that 
conflicted with early findings in that size was only 
significant for small firms. 
Ayres study 
The Ayres (1986) study extends previous research on 
choice of accounting method to a manager's decision to elect 
early adoption of an accounting standard. In 1981, the FASB 
issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 
Number 8 related to accounting for foreign currency 
translation. The statement allowed for a firm to adopt the 
guidelines in one of three years, 1981, 1982, or 1983. 
Generally, the impact in 1981 of this new statement was to 
increase earnings; therefore, the Ayres study focused on the 
decision to adopt an income increasing standard early as 
opposed to later (after 1981). 
Several of the previously identified influences on a 
manager's choice of accounting method were used in this study. 
Variables for size, dividends, unrestricted retained earnings, 
and long-term debtjtotal assets were used. A variable was 
added for control of the firm (see Dhaliwal et al. [1982]) 
which reflected the percent of stock owned by directors and 
officers. 
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Ayres proposed that the interest coverage ratio used in 
other studies may be affected by a firm's level of debt. He 
divided the study group into high and low debt subgroups. A 
variable for the existence of an incentive compensation plan 
had also been used in several previous studies. The author 
suggested this approach may have limitations because most 
companies have some type of bonus plan and many plans are not 
based on a set formula that uses accounting earnings. Also 
many plans contained upper and lower bounds for computing the 
bonus. Based on the work done by Healy (1985), Ayres proposed 
that managers with lower pre-adoption earnings would be more 
likely to elect income increasing accounting methods for 
compensation reasons. 
He hypothesized that firms choosing early adoption would 
be smaller in size, have a lower percentage of stock owned by 
directors and officers, have lower pre-adoption earnings, and 
be more constrained by debt covenants. 
The sample was drawn from firms listed in the 1981-83 
Accounting Trends and Techniques publications of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). A usable 
sample of 103 early adopters and 129 later adopters was 
achieved. Early adopters were identified as firms that made 
the change in 1981. The results of the univariate Mann­
Whitney U-test were that all variables except control and 
long-term debt to assets were significant at the 0.04 level or 
lower. A multivariate logistic model was conducted, and the 
overall model was significant at the 0.0001 level, with all 
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variables significant at the 0.05 level or lower. The test 
provided support for the hypothesis suggested by Ayres. 
In summary, this study extended positive accounting 
theory to a decision for early election of an accounting 
method. It also expanded the research done on bonus 
compensation plans by examining the effects of earnings on a 
choice of accounting method. 
Wong Study 
The study by Wong (1988) extended the research done on 
political cost to a choice of accounting method that had no 
impact on the "bottom line," but could have economic 
consequences. The study examined the way listed New Zealand 
companies account for the New Zealand export tax credit. The 
export tax credit was based on export sales that contained 
domestic products. 
New Zealand companies could account for the tax credit in 
one of two ways: as a reduction in income taxes (tax reduction 
method) or as a credit to sales (credit method). Both methods 
would result in the same "bottom line," but the credit method 
would report a higher tax rate. In the years 1980-85, there 
was strong public pressure in New Zealand to lower personal 
tax rates and increase corporate rates. Part of this public 
pressure was due to the low tax rates reported by firms using 
the tax reduction method. 
The author selected three variables to measure the 
political influences on the manager's choice of accounting 
method: tax rate, the ratio of export tax credit to income, 
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and size. Wong hypothesized that large firms with low tax 
rates and large export tax credit to income ratios would 
select the credit method. 
Interest coverage constraints could also be affected by 
this choice of accounting method. Many debt covenants require 
an interest coverage ratio computed by interest expense/pretax 
income. This variable was also included in the study. 
Wong's study used the firms listed on the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange in 1984. A usable sample of twenty-nine 
"credit" firms and sixty-six "tax reduction" firms was 
obtained. A "t" test indicated that all the variables were 
significant at the 0.03 level or lower. A multivariate legit 
analysis was done with all variables being significant. 
In summary, this study provided additional support for 
the political cost assumption in a special situation. It 
examined a choice of accounting method that was politically 
sensitive, but did not impact net income. One limitation of 
the study is that the author did not control for the industry 
effect which would have reduced the power of the other tests. 
Deakin Study 
The study by Deakin (1989) examined the decision by 
managers to lobby for a proposed change in accounting 
standards. The FASB proposed to eliminate the use of the 
"full cost" method of accounting for exploration costs by oil 
and gas companies and to require the use of the "successful 
effort" method. Companies that changed from the "full cost" 
method to the other method would likely have earnings reduced. 
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Deakin suggested that the following factors would 
influence a manager's decision to lobby: debt contract 
constraints, management incentive plans, rate regulations, and 
size of oil and gas exploration expenditures. Categorical 
variables were used for incentive plans and regulation 
factors. The author used a scoring variable to capture the 
effects of (1) the existence of accounting-based debt limits, 
(2) higher than average debt ratio, and (3) the existence of 
public debt. The dollar expenditure for oil and gas 
exploration was used as the remaining variable. Size, taxes, 
and ownership were not considered significant in this study. 
Deakin only examined firms that used the "full cost" 
method, as they were the only ones to lobby on this issue. 
His sample method produced twenty-seven firms that lobbied 
and sixty-seven that did not. 
Firms could have lobbied on three different events: the 
Discussion Memorandum, the Exposure Draft, or the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) appeal. Deakin developed a 
logistic regression model to test for all three events and 
found it significant at the 0.01 level for all events. The 
independent variables were all of the predicted sign and were 
significant for at least one event. No single variable was 
significant for all three events. Deakin suggested that 
correlation among the independent variables may explain this 
finding. 
In summary, this study provided additional support for 
the findings of Watts and Zimmerman (1978) on the decision by I I> 
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managers to lobby on an accounting issue. The study used 
firms from one industry and more specific variables than the 
earlier study by Watts and Zimmerman (1978). 
Trombley Study 
The study by Trombley (1989) also examined the decision 
by managers to adopt early a new accounting standard, but 
focused on a specialized industry, software development firms. 
In 1985, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 
Number 86, "Accounting for the Costs of Computer Software to 
be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed," was issued that 
required the capitalization of certain costs related to the 
development of software for sale. Managers could elect to 
adopt this income increasing accounting procedure for their 
1985 fiscal year. Beginning with the 1986 fiscal year, the 
procedure was required for all firms. 
In this study, Trombley focused on the influence of size 
and the role of the auditor. Firms in this industry were 
relatively small and would not be exposed to much political 
cost due to size; however, the author proposed that size may 
still be an important influence. It was assumed that the 
smaller firms in this industry would rely more heavily on 
incentive plans and bank debt and would therefore favor income 
increasing accounting methods. 
Trombley also proposed that because the average size of 
the firms in this industry was small, a firm's auditor might 
influence the choice of accounting methods. Most of the 
auditing firms filed comments on this accounting change, and 
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their preferences were determined from this source. It was 
proposed that firms that adopted early had auditors with a 
preference for software capitalization. 
Based on previous research, the author added control 
variables for direction of pre-adoption earnings, ownership 
control, and debt constraints. The univariate "t" tests found 
all variables significant except ownership control. A 
multivariate test using ordinary least squares regression was 
also significant. Again, all independent variables were 
significant with the exception of ownership control. 
In summary, t�is study extended positive accounting 
theory to an industry dominated by smaller firms. It found 
evidence that the size effect may be related to firm 
attributes other than political costs. It also found evidence 
that a smaller firm's auditor may influence a choice of 
accounting method. 
Summary of Literature Review 
The study by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) established the 
positive accounting theory research paradigm. The literature 
reviewed above captures the major subsequent research 
developments in this theory, including extension of the theory 
to managers' choice of accounting methods, refinement in the 
variables used to represent the factors that influence 
managers in choice of accounting method decisions, and better 
control of extraneous variables. These developments are 
discussed below. At the end of this chapter a summary of the 
literature review is provided in Table 3.1. 
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The Watts and Zimmerman study (1978) examined factors 
that influenced the decision by managers to lobby on a 
proposed accounting standard. Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) 
extended this research to a manager's decision on the choice 
among accounting methods, which has since dominated the 
positive accounting theory literature. This research was 
further extended by Ayres (1986) who examined a decision to 
adopt early a new accounting standard. 
Much of the research has been concerned with refinement 
of variables used to represent the factors that influence 
choice of accounting method decisions made by managers. The 
factors typically fall into four main categories: political 
costs, regulations, debt contracts, and incentive compensation 
plans. Several different variables were used in the studies 
and generally these variables were found to support the 
hypotheses tested. There were, however, inconsistences in 
these studies. Not all variables were significant in each 
study. The variable most often used for political cos� (size) 
even had a sign that was opposite of that predicted for 
certain groups of firms. Often when a theory is in its early 
stages of development, the literature is more concerned with 
reporting regularities than investigating anomalies. This 
appears to be the case for positive accounting theory. 
Control over extraneous variables has improved in the 
studies. Many of the earlier studies did not control for a 
possible industry effect. Latter studies used either firms 
from a single industry or used a matched-pair design to 
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achieve better control. Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) tried 
to consider the effects of other accounting decisions in their 
study; however, most studies in positive accounting theory 
only examines the effects of one accounting decision. 
In summary, the positive accounting theory literature 
reports findings that provide general support for the theory. 
In a ten-year review article, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) made 
several suggestions about the future research direction for 
this theory. Included in their suggestions were development 
of more precise proxy variables to represent political costs, 
intra-industry studies to achieve better control, and a method 
or model to deal with the relationships among the packages of 
accounting policy, financial policy, and organization 
structure. In examining colleges and universities in this 
study, an attempt has been made to incorporate the above 
suggestions in the research design. 
Relationship of Previous Studies to This Study 
The major difference between this study and previous 
studies in positive accounting theory is the types of 
organizations used in the research. This study is designed to 
determine whether the findings from studies done using for­
profit organizations will hold for not-for-profit 
organizations of colleges and universities. The many 
differences between these two types of organizations require 
modifications to the research variables used in other studies. 
These differences also provide an opportunity to examine 
previous findings in new ways. 
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Previous studies in positive accounting theory have 
focused mostly on a single choice of accounting method 
decision; however, Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) proposed that 
decisions regarding a particular choice of accounting method 
are not made independently of other accounting decisions. 
Instead, each decision regarding which accounting method to 
use is based on an overall financial reporting strategy. 
Financial statements, therefore, represent the overall effect 
of several interrelated decisions on accounting methods. The 
Zmijewski and Hagerman study used a model that incorporated 
the effects of several different accounting methods. Watts 
and Zimmerman ( 1990) suggested that choice of accounting 
method studies could be improved by considering the 
relationships among the various packages of accounting methods 
that affect the "bottom line." 
A somewhat different approach to this concern was used by 
Wong ( 1988) . He examined the unique factors related to a 
specific choice of accounting method. Because the accounting 
method Wong examined did not affect the "bottom line," he 
could examine the factors that were unique to this choice of 
accounting method. In this manner, the choice of accounting 
method could be examined independently of the other accounting 
method decisions of the organization. 
This study examines a choice of accounting method that 
affects the reporting of endowment funds. The performance of 
an endowment is reported separately from other funds and 
provides a separate indication of the effectiveness of an 
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organization's financial management. This aspect of not-for­
profit financial reporting provides a unique opportunity to 
reasonably isolate the effects of this accounting method 
decision from other accounting methods decisions of the 
organization. 
This study 
(1989) in that 
is similar to Deakin (1989) and Trombley 
industry, a 
confounding 
industries. 
it 
design 
effects 
examines organizations from a single 
number of which tends to limit the 
that occur from differences across 
Previous studies have used several different variables to 
represent political costs, regulations, debt contracts, and 
incentive compensation plans. Several of these variables are 
not appropriate for colleges and universities, therefore, 
other variables were selected for this study. Endowment 
assets and endowment-per-FTE were used as variables for 
political costs. Most other studies used either sales or 
assets. A variable was added to reflect whether an 
organization was publicly or privately controlled. Other 
studies have added variables to reflect ownership control and 
regulations. A debt-to-endowment variable was used in this 
study, which is similar to the debt-to-equity variable used in 
other studies. Because incentive compensation plans are not 
used in colleges and universities, an indirect variable was 
used for this study. Ayres (1986) and Trombley (1989) used 
prior-year earnings as a variable to represent management 
compensation. This study will make use of a five-year average 
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total return on endowment assets to reflect management 
compensation. 
In many ways, this study is similar to previous studies. 
Its major difference, the type of organizations examined, 
provides an advantage in isolating the effect of an accounting 
method decision; however, this requires some modifications to 
the independent variables used in other studies. 
Modifications are expected when an existing theory is extended 
to a new environment. 
study 
Watts and 
Zimmerman [1978] 
Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1979] 
Dhaliwal [1980] 
TABLE 3.1 
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Accounting 
Method 
General price­
level changes in 
financial 
statements 
Inventory 
Depreciation 
Investment tax 
credit 
Pension costs 
Exploration costs 
(full vs 
successful effort) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Size 
Incentive 
compensation 
Effects on 
earnings 
Regulation 
Size 
Industry 
concentration 
Risk 
Capital intensity 
Incentive 
compensation 
Debt-to-equity 
Results 
Used discriminant analysis and found 
support for only the size variable. 
The sample used several firms from 
the oil industry that were under 
political pressure at the time. Also 
the proposed accounting standard did 
not affect the bottom line. This 
study introduced many of the ideas of 
positive accounting theory. 
Used probit analysis for each 
accounting procedure. The model was 
significant only for depreciation 
(size, risk, and capital intensity) 
and inventory (capital intensity and 
industry concentration). 
Used matched pairs of firms to 
control for size. Debt-to-equity was 
significant using "t" tests. 
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Study 
Zmijewski and 
Hagerman [1981] 
Bowen, Noreen, and 
Lacey [1981] 
Accounting 
Method 
Inventory 
Depreciation 
Investment tax 
credit 
Pension costs 
Interest expense 
(expense vs 
capitalized) 
TABLE 3.1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Size 
Industry 
concentration 
Risk 
Capital intensity 
Incentive 
compensation 
Debt-to-equity 
Size 
Incentive 
compensation 
Limits on 
dividends 
Limits on interest 
coverage 
Limits on leverage 
Results 
Used a model that incorporated all 
four accounting procedures into an 
overall income strategy. The results 
for the probit analysis were 
significant for all three models 
(five, seven, and nine strategy 
cases). The significant explanatory 
variables were size, industry con­
centration, incentive compensation, 
and debt-to-equity. The model used an 
assumption of equal probability for 
each strategy; when this was changed, 
the results were much weaker. 
Used "t" tests and multivariate 
probit analysis. Variables related to 
debt contracts were significant. Size 
was significant only for the oil and 
gas industry and had the opposite 
sign for the other industries. 
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Study 
Dhaliwal, Salamon, 
and Smith [1982] 
Daley and Vigeland 
[1983] 
TABLE 3.1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Accounting 
Method 
Depreciation 
Research and 
development costs 
(expense vs 
capitalized) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Size 
Debt-to-equity 
Ownership control 
Size 
Limits on 
dividends 
Limits on interest 
coverage 
Type of debt 
(public vs 
private) 
Results 
Used probit analysis and found that 
all variables were significant. 
Ownership control was either 
management controlled (MC) or owner 
controlled (OC), with MC firms pre­
ferring income increasing accounting 
methods. 
Used the Mann-Whitney U-test, with 
all variables except dividend limit 
being significant. A jackknife pro­
cedure that used ordinary least 
squares was also employed. The model 
as well as the explanatory variables 
were significant (except interest 
limits). When firms were divided into 
large and small groups, size was 
significant only for small firms. 
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Study 
Ayres (1986] 
Wong [1988] 
TABLE 3.1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Accounting 
Method 
Early adopters of 
SFAS No. 8 on 
foreign currency 
translation 
New Zealand export 
tax credit 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Size 
Limits on 
dividends 
Limits on leverage 
Ownership control 
Pre-adoption 
earnings 
Size 
Limits on interest 
Tax rate 
Tax credit to 
income 
Results 
Used logistic regression and found 
that all variables were significant. 
Ownership control was based on per­
cent of stock owned by directors and 
officers. Pre-adoption earnings were 
used to capture the effects of incen­
tive compensations. Income increasing 
methods would be used if pre-adoption 
earnings were lower. 
Used logistic regression and found 
all variables significant. Size, tax 
rate, and tax credit to income were 
proxy variables for political cost. 
Accounting choice did not effect the 
"bottom line," but had an influence 
on political costs and debt con­
tracts. 
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Study 
Deakin (1989] 
Trombley [1989] 
TABLE 3.1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Accounting 
Method 
Elimination of 
"full cost" 
accounting 
treatment for 
exploration 
expenditures 
Early adoption of 
SFAS No. 86 on 
cost of developing 
software for sale 
(expense vs 
capitalized) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Debt covenant 
constraints 
Incentive 
compensation 
Regulation 
Exploration 
expenditures 
Size 
Limits on leverage 
Ownership control 
Prior year 
earnings 
Auditor 
Results 
Used logistic regression to test the 
influence of the variables on three 
different events. The model was 
significant for all three events. The 
explanatory variables were signifi­
cant at least in one of the three 
events. A scoring variable was used 
for debt constraints that incor­
porated accounting based debt limits, 
type and size of debt. 
Used ordinary least squares regres­
sion and found all variables except 
ownership to be significant. Auditor 
was included as a variable because of 
the possible influence of the 
auditor's preference. Because the 
average size of firms in this 
industry was small, the influence of 
size was not considered to be related 
to political costs. Smaller firms 
were found to be early adopters of 
this income increasing accounting 
method. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, the sample design for this study is 
first described. The statistical methods for testing the 
research hypotheses developed in Chapter 1 are then discussed. 
Sample Design 
There are over 3,300 colleges and universities in the 
United States. Not all institutions have endowment funds, and 
those that are endowed have funds of varying amounts. This 
study is designed to determine the relationship of certain 
institutional characteristics and the choice of accounting 
method for endowment investments; therefore, institutions with 
little or no endowment funds are not included. Specifically, 
this study is limited to four-year colleges and universities 
with endowment investments larger than one million dollars. 
Information on college and university endowments is 
available from only a few sources. A major source of 
financial information about colleges and universities is the 
United States Department of Education which collects data 
annually as part of its Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS). Another source of information is the 
1989 NACUBO Endowment Study (NES) published by the National 
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Association of College and University Business Officers 
(NACUBO). The NES, compiled from data obtained directly from 
approximately 330 four-year colleges and universities with 
endowment investments larger than one million dollars, 
includes information necessary for this study related to 
endowment size, endowment-per-FTE, "total return," type of 
institution, investment allocations, spending rates, and 
location. Some of this information is coded in the NES to 
maintain confidentiality and is not available from other 
sources. 
Preliminary discussions with NACUBO personnel indicated 
an interest in this study and a willingness to share 
information from their NES. The NACUBO data base used for 
their NES was the only known source for certain information 
needed for this study; therefore, the 330 colleges and 
universities listed in the NES became the initial sample for 
this study. 
The NES does not include information related to the 
amount of institutional debt. This information is, however, 
gathered annually as part of the United States Department of 
Education's I PEDS project. The most current information 
distributed by the Department of Education is for the 1986-87 
fiscal year. The National Data Service for Higher Education 
received an advance copy of the 1987-88 fiscal year IPEDS data 
tapes from the Department of Education; the information 
regarding institutional debt was obtained from this source for 
this study. Ideally, debt information for the 1988-89 fiscal 
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year would be desirable; however, this information was not 
available at the time of this study. The impact of using 
outstanding debt from 1987-88 should not have a major 
influence on this study because debt structures typically do 
not change significantly over a one-year period. For example, 
institutions in the study reported an increase in long-term 
debt of only 1.1 percent for fiscal year 1987-88. In 
addition, because this study excludes institutions that 
changed accounting methods during this time period, any 
institutions that changed accounting methods due to a change 
in debt structure in 1988-89 will not be included in the 
study. 
Information on the accounting methods used for endowment 
investments and the identification of the institution's 
auditor was collected from a questionnaire since the 
information was not available from any other sources (see 
Appendix A). NACUBO sponsored the survey under its letterhead 
and mailed the questionnaire in September 1990. 
The initial sample for this study was the 330 colleges 
and universities that participated in the NES. As described 
earlier, additional institutional information was obtained 
from the IPEDS report and from 
mailed to the same institutions. 
a separate questionnaire 
For an institution to be 
included in the final sample of this study, several 
requirements had to be met. The first requirement was that 
all information for an institution be available from the 
sources used. Several institutions were not reflected in the 
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IPEDS report and several others did not have complete 
information in the NES. 
The second requirement for inclusion in this study was 
that the institution used a reporting date of June 30, 1989 
for information submitted to NACUBO. Because the value of 
investments can change significantly from month to month, a 
common reporting date was considered necessary for the study. 
The third requirement for inclusion in this study was 
that the institution had not changed its accounting method for 
investments during the last five years. This requirement was 
necessary in order to examine the five-year average total 
return on investments as one of the variables in this study. 
The final requirement was that the institution return the 
questionnaire. As stated earlier, the questionnaire was 
mailed by NACUBO in September 1990. Telephone follow-ups were 
done the first two weeks of October 1990. The results of the 
above procedures are discussed in Chapter 4. 
Statistical Methods 
As an initial step in analyzing the data in this study, 
univariate significance tests are used to examine the 
importance of each variable on the choice of accounting method 
for endowment investments. A chi-square test of independence 
is used for the qualitative variables and a "t" test is used 
for the quantitative variables. 
In order to study the simultaneous, or j oint, influence 
of several factors on the choice of accounting method, a 
multivariate approach is necessary. Previous research in 
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choice of accounting method has primarily used probabilistic 
regression (probit), logistic regression (logit), and ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression. 
In a recent article, Noreen (1988) explored the use of 
probit and OLS regression in accounting classification 
studies. OLS regression is based on certain assumptions; 
specifically, the model is assumed to be linear and the errors 
are assumed to be normally and independently distributed with 
zero expectation and a common variance. Accounting 
classification studies usually have a dichotomous dependent 
variable which violates certain of the assumptions underlying 
OLS regression; specifically, the assumptions of the normally 
distributed errors and constant variance are not met, which 
can create some statistical problems. 
While probit and logit assumptions are not violated by a 
dichotomous variable, they are more difficult to use and 
interpret. Noreen compared the results of OLS regression with 
probit for a simulation model that used explanatory variables 
typical of those used in many accounting studies. The results 
indicate that for sample sizes of 50 and 100 the observed 
level of rejection of the null hypothesis was closer to the 
nominal level for OLS regression in most cases. The rejection 
region for the probit model was not well specified, and that 
OLS produced results at least equal to probit. 
In a similar study, Stone and Rasp (1991) compare the 
choice between logit and OLS regression for accounting choice 
studies. Experimental results comparing nominal significance 
57 
levels with empirical significance levels for legit and OLS 
regression show that in most cases the empirical levels are 
closer to the nominal levels for OLS regression. The 
differences between nominal and empirical levels were not 
statistically significant for OLS regression with all sample 
sizes used (50, 100, and 200); however, for sample sizes of 50 
and 100, the differences in nominal and empirical levels were 
significant for legit. One conclusion of this study is that 
OLS regression performs better than legit for sample sizes of 
50 and 100. For sample sizes of 200, legit and OLS regression 
perform equally well. 
Preliminary examination of the data in this research is 
consistent with other studies that used a dichotomous 
dependent variable. The standardized residuals (errors) were 
plotted against the independent variables, which revealed that 
the residuals were heteroscedastic and non-normal. Explor­
atory use of probi t and log it on the data in this study 
indicated that these methods did not reveal any information 
beyond that produced using OLS regression. Based on Noreen's 
conclusions, the findings of Stone and Rasp, the consistent 
findings of this exploratory analysis, and the fact that OLS 
regression is understood by a wider audience, OLS regression 
was selected as the primary method for the analysis and the 
reporting of results for this study. 
An additional assumption of the OLS regression model is 
that the explanatory variables should not be highly 
interrelated, or collinear. Collinearity analysis was 
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performed to validate this assumption. Results of the 
collinearity analysis are discussed in Chapter 4. 
Objective One 
The first objective of this study is to determine if the 
findings of previous research in positive accounting theory 
hold true for the choice of accounting method for endowment 
investments by colleges and universities, which are not-for­
profit institutions. To meet this objective, five specific 
research hypotheses were identified in Chapter 1. Support, or 
lack of support, for each hypothesis requires determining the 
influence of certain institutional characteristics on the 
accounting method used for endowment investments. The 
accounting method used for investments (cost or FMV) was 
obtained from the questionnaire. 
Hypothesis 1 tests the influence of type of institution 
on the accounting method used for endowment investments. A 
categorical variable (TYPE) was used to distinguish between 
public and private colleges and universities. This 
information was obtained from the NES. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 test the influence of the size of an 
institution's endowment and the size of the endowment-per-FTE 
on the accounting method used for endowment investments, 
respectively. Information on the size of an institution's 
endowment (SIZE) and endowment-per-FTE (EFTE) was obtained 
from the NES. 
Hypothesis 4 tests for the influence of total return for 
an institution's endowment investments on the accounting 
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method used for endowment investments. The NES lists returns 
by years as well as cumulatively. This study used the average 
return (TRET) for the last five years (1985-1989), a time 
period believed to be sufficient to eliminate any short-term 
variation in returns due to market conditions. The effects of 
the 1987 "stock market crash" should also be minimized by 
using this time period. 
Hypothesis 5 tests for the influence of the debt-to-
endowment ratio of institutions on the accounting method used 
for endowment investments. Information related to outstanding 
debt and fair market value of endowment investments (DEBT/END) 
was obtained from the IPEDS information for 1987-88 and the 
NES, respectively. 
The following is a summary of variables used to 
investigate Objective One. 
y METHOD Accounting method for investments (coded: 0 
= cost and 1 = FMV) . 
TYPE An identifier for public and private 
institutions (coded: o = public and 1 = private). 
SIZE The fair market value of the endowment 
investments as of June 30, 1989. 
EFTE The fair market value of the endowment 
investments-per-FTE as of June 30, 1989. 
TRET The average total return of the endowment 
investments for the last five years (1985-1989). 
DEBT/END The ratio of total long-term debt (June 
30, 1988) to the fair market value of the endowment 
investments (June 30, 1989). 
A multiple regression model (Model 1) is used to 
investigate the first objective of the study. The general 
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null hypothesis for the first objective is that there is no 
significant relationship between the variables associated with 
positive accounting theory research and the choice of 
accounting method for endowment investments by colleges and 
universities. Model 1 is as follows: 
Model 1 
Y = A + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3 + B4X4 + B5X5 + E 
where: 
Dependent Variable 
Y = METHOD 
Independent Variables 
X1 TYPE 
X2 SIZE 
X3 EFTE 
X4 TRET 
X5 DEBT/END 
B1 • • • •  B5 = coefficients 
A intercept 
E error term 
Model 1 examines the joint influence of all variables 
together on the choice of accounting method. Hypotheses 1-5 
focus on the significance of each independent variable in the 
multiple regression equation for Model 1. The specific null 
hypothesis for each of the independent variables x1 - x5 
assumes that the regression coefficient for each variable is 
not significantly different from 0. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis would indicate that the independent variable 
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is not significantly related to the choice of accounting 
method for investments. 
If the study's findings are consistent with those of 
previous research on positive accounting theory, the null 
hypothesis should be rejected and the coefficients of the 
independent variables should be statistically significant, 
with the variables TYPE, TRET, and DEBT/END having positive 
signs, and the variables SIZE and EFTE having negative signs. 
Objective Two 
The second objective of this study is to determine if 
certain other institutional characteristics of colleges and 
universities are associated with the choice of accounting 
method for endowment investments. The other institutional 
characteristics included in this study were identified in 
Chapter 1 and are described below. 
The institution's auditor may have an influence on the 
choice of accounting method for investments. Generally, an 
individual institution is relatively small when compared to 
the total group of colleges and universities, and therefore 
its choice of accounting method may be influenced by the 
preferences of outside organizations. Specifically, the 
institution's auditor may influence the choice of accounting 
method for investments. Two audit firms, KPMG Peat Marwick 
and Coopers & Lybrand, have a strong presence in the college 
and university environment. To a lesser extent, other "Big 
Six" firms also audit a significant number of institutions. 
A categorical variable was added for auditor (AUDITOR) . The 
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variable has four categories, KPMG Peat Marwick, Coopers & 
Lybrand, other "Big Six," and all others. The information was 
obtained from the questionnaire sent to the institutions. 
The composition of an institution's endowment investments 
may also have an influence on the choice of accounting method 
for investments. Investments in equity as well as in real 
estate may be more politically sensitive than other types of 
investments. These investments, which are usually considered 
more risky than traditional fixed income investments, produce 
higher returns on which the institutions pay no taxes. This 
condition may incre�se the threat of some political action, 
such as a tax on endowment investment earnings. Variables for 
the percent of funds invested in equity (% EQUITY) and real 
estate (% REAL) were used in this study. This information was 
obtained from the NES. 
As part of an overall endowment management program, many 
institutions have adopted a "spending rate policy." Under 
such a policy, an institution sets the amount of funds that 
are available to be expended from the endowment each year, 
usually based on some function of the fair market value of the 
endowment investments. A decision to use a spending rate may 
also influence the decision regarding the choice of accounting 
method for investments. A variable (SPENDING) was added to 
the study to reflect the existence of a spending rate policy. 
This information was obtained from the NES. 
Colleges and universities belong to several organizations 
and associations that are regional in focus. For example, 
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accreditation associations are organized on a regional basis, 
and business officers of most institutions generally belong to 
regional professional organizations. Typically, at these 
regional meetings, managers exchange ideas on institutional 
practices that may have an influence on an institution's 
operation. In addition, there may be some systematic 
differences in the culture and economic influences of the 
various regions. Therefore, an institution's location may 
have an influence on the choice of accounting method. A 
categorical variable (REGION) was added to the study to 
determine the effect of location, determined by region 
(northeast, southeast, midwest, and west), on the choice of 
accounting method. 
The following is a summary of variables used to 
investigate Objective Two of the study: 
y METHOD Accounting method for investments (coded: 0 
= cost and 1 = FMV). 
AUDITOR A variable for auditor that reflects one 
of four groups as discussed earlier. Three dummy 
variables, AUDITOR!, AUDITOR2, and AUDITOR3, are 
used to reflect the four groups (coded: 1 0 0 
KPMG Peat Marwick, 0 1 0 = Coopers & Lybrand, o o 1 
other "Big Six," and 0 0 0 = all other). 
% EOUITY The percent of endowment funds placed in 
equity investments. 
X8 % REAL The percent of endowment funds placed in 
real estate. 
X9 SPENDING The existence of a spending rate policy. 
(coded: 1 = payout less than 5%, 2 = payout between 
5% and 7%, 3 = payout greater than 7%, and 4 = 
payout of all income) . 
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x10 = REGION A variable to reflect location in one of 
four regions. Three dummy variables, REGION!, 
REGION2, and REGION3, are used to reflect the four 
regions (coded: 1 0 0 northeast, 0 1 0 
southeast, 0 0 1 = midwest, and 0 0 0 = west). 
There are, of course, other variables in addition to the 
ones listed above that may have an influence on the choice of 
accounting 
universities. 
method for investments by 
These other variables 
colleges and 
are considered 
uncontrolled extraneous variables. The assumption is that all 
other variables will have no significant impact on the 
dependent variable. It is possible these variables may vary 
in a systematic way that will result in confounding effects on 
the variables under study; however, the research method used 
should reduce the risk of this occurring. The data selection 
and variable identification processes described above are 
designed for that purpose. 
A multiple regression model (Model 2) is used to 
investigate the second objective of the study. The general 
null hypothesis for the second objective is that there is no 
significant relationship between the variables representing 
certain other institutional characteristics and the choice of 
accounting method for endowment investments by colleges and 
universities. Model 2 is as follows: 
Model 2 
.where: 
-:_.:. ,_Dep�!l�ent Variable 
Y = METHOD 
Independent Variables 
xG AUDITOR 
x7 % EQUITY 
X a % REAL 
x9 SPENDING 
xlO REGION 
B6 . • . .  B10 = coefficients 
A intercept 
E error term 
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Model 2 examines the joint influence of all the variables 
together on the choice of accounting method. Hypotheses 6-10 
focus on the significance of each independent variable in the 
multiple regression equation for Model 2. The specific null 
hypotheses for each of the independent variables x6 - x10 
assume that the regression coefficient for each variable is 
not significantly different from o. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis would indicate that the independent variable 
is not significantly related to the choice of accounting 
method for investments. 
If the identified institutional characteristics are 
statistically significant, the null hypothesis should be 
rejected and the coefficients of the independent variables 
should be statistically significant with the variables 
% EQUITY and % REAL having negative signs. Specific signs for 
the coefficients of the variables AUDITOR, SPENDING, and 
REGION were not predicted. 
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Combined Model 
Both Model 1 (variables X1 - X5) and Model 2 (variables 
x6 - x10) examine the relationship of certain institutional 
characteristics on the choice of accounting method for 
endowment investments. A third regression model (Combined 
Model), constructed by using all variables from the two 
models, is used as an exploratory study for this data. The 
joint influence of all ten variables on the choice of 
accounting method may reveal information that was not 
discovered in the two separate models. While the primary 
focus of this study is Model 1, an investigation into positive 
accounting theory, Model 2 provides additional information 
about the choice of accounting method for the institutions 
studied, colleges and universities. Therefore, it is logical 
to combine the variables from both models to see if the 
Combined Model reveals information that may be useful in 
understanding the influence of these variables on the choice 
of accounting method for investments. 
CHAPTER 4 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
The results of the data gathering process and a des­
cription of the data are presented in the earlier pages of 
this chapter. These are followed by a presentation of the 
hypotheses testing results of Model 1 for Objective One of the 
study and then the hypotheses testing results of Model 2 for 
Objective Two. Finally, the results of the Combined Model are 
reported. 
Data Gathering Results 
A summary of the results of the data gathering process 
used for the study is reported in Table 4. 1. For an 
institution to be included in the study, the following 
requirements had to be met: complete information was 
available, the reporting date of June 30, 1989 was used, the 
questionnaire was returned, and there was no change in 
accounting method for endowment investments in the last five 
years. Of the 330 colleges and universities used in the NES, 
137 institutions had to be eliminated: 102 because 
insufficient data were available from either the IPEDS report 
or from the NES; and 35 because the reporting date used to 
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submit information to NACUBO was other than June 30, 1989. 
This resulted in an adjusted sample size of 193 institutions. 
A questionnaire was mailed to the 193 institutions in the 
adjusted sample. Responses were received from 136 of these 
institutions. To increase the response rate, telephone calls 
were placed to the 57 institutions that did not return the 
questionnaire. A total of 34 responses were obtained through 
telephone conversations. Typically, a telephone response 
could not be obtained because the person responsible for this 
area was not available at the time. The total number of 
responses obtained was 170, or 88% (170/193) of the 
institutions in the adjusted sample. 
TABLE 4.1 
DATA GATHERING RESULTS 
Number of Institutions in the NES 
Less: Institutions Eliminated Due to: 
330 
Insufficient Data 102 
Report Date Other Than June 30, 1989 35 
Adjusted Sample Size 193 
Number of Completed Questionnaires Returned 136 
Plus: Number of Questionnaires Completed by Phone 34 
Total Responses 170 
Less: Institutions that Changed Accounting Method 8 
Total Usable Sample 162 
Eight institutions indicated on the questionnaire that 
their method of accounting for endowment investments had 
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changed in the last five years. All but one of these 
institutions changed from the cost method to the FMV method. 
These institutions were deleted from the sample, resulting in 
a usable sample of 162 institutions (see Appendix B for a list 
of institutions). In addition, nine other institutions 
indicated that they had considered changing their accounting 
method for investments in the last five years, but had not 
done so. All nine institutions were using the cost method but 
had considered the FMV method. 
Data Description 
In order to better understand the factors that influence 
the choice of accounting method for endowment investments, 
some characteristics of the institutions are examined. The 
data indicate that the 162 institutions in the sample 
represent a broad range of institutions. For example, Table 
4. 2 reports information related to an institution 1 s size, 
measured by its endowment, number of full-time-equivalent 
(FTE) students, and the endowment-per-FTE. 
TABLE 4.2 
INSTITUTIONAL SIZE 
Endowment FTE Endowment-
Measure ($000s) Students Per-FTE 
Maximum 4,478,976 73,734 398,369 
Third Quartile 185,227 10,579 60,805 
Median 69,590 3,088 20,691 
First Quartile 30,339 1,562 6,554 
Minimum 3,394 419 381 
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Additional institutional characteristics are summarized 
in Table 4. 3 and Table 4. 4. These tables also report the 
results of the hypotheses tests that are used to determine if 
each institutional characteristic is significantly related to 
the choice of accounting method. 
TABLE 4.3 
DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS FOR QUALITATIVE VARIABLES 
Variable: TYPE 
Method 
Cost 
FMV 
Public 
30 
3 
Private 
99 
30 
Chi-square significance 
Variable: AUDITOR 
KPMG Peat Coopers & 
Method Marwick Lybrand 
Cost 36 22 
FMV 5 15 
Chi-square significance 
Variable: REGION 
Method Northeast Southeast 
Cost 46 30 
FMV 21 5 
Total 
129 
33 
o. 071 
Other 
"Big Six" 
42 
11 
0.002 
Midwest 
36 
7 
Chi square significance 0.014 
All 
Others 
29 
2 
West 
17 
0 
Total 
129 
33 
Total 
129 
33 
Table 4.3 summarizes the number of institutions that use 
the cost or FMV method according to three qualitative 
characteristics. The characteristic "type of institution" is 
identified by the variable TYPE. which is used to distinguish 
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public and private institutions. A second characteristic, the 
institution's audit firm, is identified by the variable 
AUDITOR, and is used to classify the audit firm into one of 
four categories. The third qualitative characteristic, the 
location of the institution, is identified by the variable 
REGION, which classifies its location into one of four 
regional designations. 
A chi-square test of independence is used to determine if 
the choice of method is independent of each of the qualitative 
characteristics, type of institution, audit firm, and regional 
location. The chi-square test is valid because all cells have 
expected frequencies of at least five, except one cell for the 
variables REGION and AUDITOR. But for these two variables, 
fewer than twenty percent of the expected frequencies are less 
than five, thereby validating the use of the chi-square test. 
The computed chi-square values for the data in Table 4. 3 
indicate that all three variables have a statistically 
significant influence on the choice of accounting method for 
endowment investments at less than the 0.10 level. 
Table 4.4 presents descriptive statistics for the 
quantitative variables used in the study. The variables SIZE 
and EFTE are used to reflect the size of the endowment and 
the average endowment per full-time-equivalent student, 
respectively. The variable TRET is the institution's five­
year average return on the endowment and DEBT/END is its debt­
to-endowment ratio. The variables % EQUITY and % REAL are 
used to reflect the percent of the endowment invested in 
TABLE 4.4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR QUANTITATIVE VARIABLES 
(-----cost (n=129)-----) (-----FMV (n=33)-----) 
Level of 
Mean/ Mean/ Signifi-
Standard Minimum/ Standard Minimum/ cance for 
Variables Deviation Maximum Deviation Maximum "t" test 
SIZE * 148.14 3.39 459.67 12.43 0.008 
290.83 2483.83 872.78 4478.98 
EFTE ** 41.12 0.38 65.67 0.81 0.042 
58.57 398.37 71.07 264.08 
TRET 15.20 0.40 16.45 4.10 0.038 
3.00 20.90 3.24 20.50 
DEBT/END 0.56 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.352 
1. 21 10.73 0.37 1.61 
% EQUITY 49.42 o.oo 56.07 37.40 0.024 
16.29 87.80 7.73 70.10 
% REAL 2.09 0.00 1.68 0.00 0.618 
4.42 35.70 2.58 9.90 
SPENDING 1. 91 0.00 2.12 0.00 0.484 
1. 48 4.00 1.62 4.00 
* Expressed in $10-6 
** Expressed in $10-3 
-..1 
(\) 
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equity funds and real estate, respectively. SPENDING is used 
to reflect the institution's endowment spending rate policy. 
A "t" test is often used to determine if there is a 
significant difference between the means of two groups. A "t" 
test was performed on each of the variables in Table 4.4 to 
determine if there is a significant difference in the mean for 
institutions using FMV and the mean for institutions using the 
cost method. The results of the "t" test indicate that the 
means are significantly different at less than the 0.10 level 
for all variables except DEBT/END, % REAL, and SPENDING. This 
suggests that the variables SIZE, EFTE, TRET, and % EQUITY 
influence the choice of accounting method. The "t" test 
examines the influence of each variable on the choice of 
accounting method independent of the others. Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression is used in the next section to 
examine the joint influence of the variables used together. 
Empirical Tests for Objective One 
Objective One is evaluated by testing the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant relationship between the 
variables associated with positive accounting theory research 
and the choice of accounting method for endowment investments 
by colleges and universities. OLS regression is used to 
determine the variables that have an influence on the choice 
of accounting method for endowment investments. The 
regression assumption that the independent variables are not 
collinear is first validated, and then the results of the data 
analysis are reported. 
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Collinearity Analysis 
An assumption of the regression model is that the 
explanatory variables are not highly interrelated. The 
independent variables used for this study represent several 
different institutional characteristics, and some of these 
characteristics may be related to others. Relationships among 
the independent variables is termed collinearity and is common 
with non-experimental social science data. When the degree of 
collinearity is large, the variance of the regression 
coefficients becomes large. This reduces the reliability of 
tests of significance and makes the regression coefficients 
unstable. Two measures are used to determine the level of 
collinearity: variance inflation factors and condition 
indexes. 
The variance inflation factor indicates the degree of 
relationship between one independent variable (Xj) and all 
other independent variables. 
(VIF) is computed as follows: 
VI F j = 1 / ( 1 - R/ ) 
The variance inflation factor 
j 1,2, ... ,k 
where Rj2 is the multiple coefficient of determination between 
variable Xj and the other k-1 independent variables. If one 
independent variable is completely unrelated to the other 
independent variables, the variance inflation factor would 
equal one. Kleinbaum et al. (1988 p. 210) state that variance 
inflation factors greater than ten indicate that collinearity 
may seriously influence the regression estimates. 
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Table 4. 5 reports the variance inflation factors for 
Objective One. The variance inflation factors range from 
1.1618 to 1.9126 and indicate that the independent variables 
are unrelated to one another; therefore, collinearity should 
not seriously influence the regression estimates. 
TABLE 4.5 
VARIANCE INFLATION FACTORS FOR OBJECTIVE ONE 
Variable 
Intercept 
TYPE 
SIZE 
EFTE 
TRET 
DEBT/END 
Variance Inflation 
Factor 
0 
1.3926 
1. 5682 
1. 9126 
1. 1618 
1. 2549 
Condition indexes provide a second method for detecting 
collinearity. Condition indexes are determined from the 
principal component analysis of the independent variables. 
The principal components, a set of new variables, are linear 
combinations of the original independent variables. Kleinbaum 
et al. (1988 p. 212) explain: 
The variances of the these (principal) components 
are called eigenvalues. The larger the eigenvalue, 
the more important is the associated principal 
component in representing the information in the 
predictor. As an eigenvalue approaches zero, the 
presence of near collinearity among the original 
predictors is indicated. The presence of an 
eigenvalue that is exactly 0 means that a perfect 
linear dependency exists among the predictors. 
The condition index of a principal component is the square 
root of the ratio of the largest eigenvalue to the eigenvalue 
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of that individual component. The largest condition index, 
called the condition number, is a summary measure of the 
degree of relationship among the independent variables. 
Belsley et al. (1980 p. 105) indicate that condition indexes 
of five to ten represent weak relationships, whereas condition 
indexes of 30 to 100 represent moderate to strong 
relationships. 
Table 4. 6 reports the eigenvalues and the condition 
indexes for Objective One, which range from 1.000 to 15.982. 
The condition number of 15.982 (largest condition index) 
suggests reasonably weak relationships among the independent 
variables. 
TABLE 4.6 
CONDITION INDEXES FOR OBJECTIVE ONE 
Principal Condition 
Component Eigenvalue Index 
1 3.792 1.000 
2 1.105 1. 852 
3 0.715 2.302 
4 0.258 3.834 
5 0.115 5.738 
6 0.015 15.982 
Belsley et al. (1980 p. 117) suggest that collinearity is 
potentially harmful only if large condition indexes and large 
variance proportions occur together. The variance proportion 
referred to here is a measure of the proportion of the total 
variance in the estimated regression coefficient that is 
associated with a particular principal component. 
77 
Collinearity is likely to be troublesome if more than one 
variance proportion loads heavily (greater than 0.5) on a 
large condition index. Since the condition number of 15.982 
in Table 4. 6 does not suggest the potential existence of 
harmful collinearity, the variance proportions are not 
presented here. 
Both VIFs and the condition indexes indicate that harmful 
collinearity is not present in the regression model for 
Objective One; therefore, the impact of collinearity on the 
regression estimates should not be harmful. 
Data Analysis 
An OLS regression model was used to determine the 
influence of variables associated with positive accounting 
theory on the choice of accounting method for endowment 
investments. The descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in the regression model are reported in Table 4.7. The 
dependent variable, Y, is a dichotomous variable with the 
value 0 used to represent the cost method and the value 1 to 
represent the FMV method. 
The results of the regression model for Objective One are 
presented in Table 4.8. The joint relationship of several 
independent variables on the dependent variable is judged by 
the overall test of significance for the model. 
of variance presented in the upper portion 
The analysis 
of Table 4.8 
indicates the regression equation is statistically significant 
at the 0.0059 level. The regression equation has a multiple 
coefficient of determination, R2, of 0.0991 and an adjusted R2 
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TABLE 4.7 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR OBJECTIVE ONE 
Variable 
TYPE 
SIZE* 
EFTE** 
TRET 
Mean 
0.80 
211.60 
46.12 
15.46 
DEBT/END 0.52 
* Expressed in $10-6 
** Expressed in $10-3 
(n=162) 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.40 
484.24 
61.88 
3.08 
1.10 
Range 
01 1 
3.4 - 4479.0 
0.4 - 398.4 
0.4 - 20.9 
0.0 - 10.7 
of 0. 0702, which indicates that the independent variables 
explain almost ten percent of the variation in the choice of 
accounting method for endowment investments. 
An individual test of hypothesis for each independent 
variable is used to determine which independent variables are 
significantly related to the choice of accounting method for 
endowment investment. The lower portion of Table 4.8 shows 
that three of the five independent variables are statistically 
significant at less than the 0.10 level. TYPE is significant 
at the 0.0844 level and TRET is significant at the 0.0882 
level, with both variables having the expected sign. SIZE is 
significant at the 0.0054 level but does not have the expected 
sign. 
As reported, SIZE does not have the expected sign. It 
was hypothesized that possible poFtical costs would influence 
the larger institutions to choose the cost method for 
accounting for investments. If this were true, there would be 
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TABLE 4.8 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR OBJECTIVE ONE 
Sum of Mean 
DF Squares Squares F Prob> F 
Model 5 2.6028 0.5206 3.43 0.0059* 
Error 156 23.6749 0.1518 
Total 161 26.2778 
R2 = 0.0991 
Adjusted R2 = 0.0702 
Variables 
(Expected B Standard T for H0: Prob> 
Sign) Value Error B Value= 0 I TI 
Intercept -0.2253 0.1903 -1.184 0.2383 
TYPE ( +) 0.1558 0.0897 1. 737 0.0844* 
SIZE (-) 2.2E-07 7.9E-08 2.822 0.0054* 
EFTE (-) -6.2E-07 6.9E-07 -0.908 0.3651 
TRET ( +) 0.0184 0.0107 1. 715 0.0882* 
DEBT/END ( +) 0.0026 0.0313 0.082 0.9346 
* Significant at the 0.10 Level or Less 
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an inverse relationship between METHOD and SIZE. However, the 
sign of the coefficient for SIZE is positive, suggesting a 
direct relationship. A possible explanation for the results 
obtained in this study is that the size of endowment has a 
different meaning for colleges and universities than does the 
size of sales in for-profit organizations. Zmijewski and 
Hagerman (1981) found that smaller firms, and firms in less 
concentrated industries, do not consider political costs in 
choosing among accounting methods. Bowen, Noreen, and Lacey 
(1981) also found a positive relationship between size and the 
choice of an accounting method that increases reported income 
for firms that are not in a politically sensitive industry. 
A "threshold" effect has been suggested where only large firms 
in politically sensitive or highly concentrated industries 
consider political costs; therefore, colleges and universities 
appear not to be affected by political costs concerns. 
Prior to the data analysis, this study was discussed with 
representatives from colleges and universities and their 
opinion was that "bigger was better" when it came to endowment 
size. Furthermore, they suggested that it was important to an 
institution's fund raising effort to be able to discuss the 
size of the endowment fund and to compare the size of 
endowment funds for similar institutions. The concern over 
possible political costs was not raised by the representatives 
from this group. Therefore, the positive coefficient for SIZE 
may partly be due to the positive effect that a large 
endowment has on an institution. 
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EFTE and DEBT/END were not statistically significant; 
however, both were of the expected sign. EFTE, endowment-per­
FTE student, and SIZE, the total value of the endowment, are 
two different measures of the size of the endowment. SIZE 
appears to have a stronger relationship on accounting choice 
than does EFTE. DEBT/END had the smallest "t" value of any 
variable in the regression model, which suggests that it 
provides the least influence in the model. It appears that 
DEBT/END may not be a comparable ratio to the debt-to-equity 
ratio used by for-profit organizations. In addition, the 
reliance on debt by colleges and universities appears less 
important than in the for-profit organizations. For example, 
the firms in the study by Dhaliwal (1980) had a mean debt-to­
equity ratio of 0.68, which indicates a substantially higher 
reliance on debt than the mean debt-to-endowment ratio of 0.52 
(Table 4.7) for the institutions included in this study. 
The "t" tests for each individual variable were reported 
in Table 4.4. There was not a significant difference in the 
means of cost and FMV for DEBT/END. The difference in means 
for EFTE was significant at the 0.042 level. This indicates 
that EFTE provides information in explaining the choice of 
accounting method, but because it is not significant in the 
regression model, other independent variables in the OLS 
regression model are more important in explaining the choice 
of accounting method. 
As a further validation of Model 1, both legit and probit 
models were examined with the above variables. The results 
82 
(see Appendix C) are consistent with the OLS regression model. 
The same variables that were significant under the OLS model 
were also significant for legit and probit; however, the level 
of significance for TYPE and TRET was slightly above the 0.10 
level using legit. These findings provide further verification 
of the results stated for OLS regression. 
Summary for Objective One 
In summary, the results of the overall OLS regression 
equation are consistent with the general hypothesis for 
Objective One, that the choice of accounting method for 
endowment investments by colleges and universities is 
influenced by the variables associated with positive 
accounting theory. 
For the specific hypotheses related to the five 
independent variables, the results were mixed. The hypotheses 
related to government regulations (TYPE) and bonus 
compensation provisions (TRET) were supported. The hypothesis 
related to political costs had two variables in the model, 
SIZE and EFTE. As explained earlier, SIZE was significant but 
not of the expected sign. EFTE was not significant in the OLS 
regression equation but it was significant as an individual 
variable in the "t" test. It appears the political costs 
associated with size in for-profit organizations may not have 
the same effect for colleges and universities. size appears 
to be positively correlated with the choice of an accounting 
method that will increase reported assets and earnings. The 
hypothesis related to debt covenants (DEBT/END) was not 
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supported. Debt does not appear to have a significant 
influence on the choice of accounting method for endowment 
investments. 
The model did not explain a large amount (R2 = .0991, see 
Table 4.8) of the variability observed in the accounting 
method used by colleges and universities. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990) report that in many studies related to positive 
accounting theory, the explanatory power of the model is low. 
For example, in the studies reviewed in Chapter 2, the 
explanatory values, R2, range from a low of 0. 0898 for 
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) to a high of 0.396 for Trombley 
(1989). According to Watts and Zimmerman, the real issue is 
the lack of an alternative model with stronger explanatory 
value. The findings here are consistent with the level of 
explanatory values for other studies on positive accounting 
theory. 
Empirical Tests for Objective Two 
Objective Two is evaluated by testing the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant relationship between the 
variables representing certain 
characteristics and the choice of 
other institutional 
accounting method for 
endowment investments by colleges and universities. Again, 
OLS regression is used to determine the variables that have a 
statistically significant influence on the choice of 
accounting method for investments. The regression assumption 
regarding collinearity is first validated and then the data 
analysis results are reported. 
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Collinearity Analysis 
The assumption regarding collinearity was explained 
earlier. Variance inflation factors and condition indexes 
were again used to determine the level of collinearity in the 
model. The variance inflation factors for Objective Two, 
reported in Table 4.9, range from 1.0177 to 2.9812, indicating 
that collinearity should not seriously influence the 
regression estimates. 
TABLE 4.9 
VARIANCE INFLATION FACTORS FOR OBJECTIVE TWO 
Variance Inflation 
Variable Factor 
Intercept 0 
AUDITOR! 1.9578 
AUDITOR2 2.0487 
AUDITOR3 1. 9403 
% 
EQUITY 1. 0401 
% 
REAL 1. 0177 
SPENDING 1. 0343 
REGION! 2.9812 
REGION2 2. 5114 
REGION3 2.7394 
Table 4.10 reports the condition indexes. The condition 
number of 13.728 suggests reasonably weak relationships among 
the independent variables. Since the condition number does 
not suggest the potential existence of harmful collinearity, 
the variance proportions are not presented here. 
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TABLE 4.10 
CONDITION INDEXES FOR OBJECTIVE TWO 
Principal Condition 
Component Eigenvalue Index 
1 4.590 1.000 
2 1. 307 1.874 
3 1.168 1.982 
4 0.860 2.311 
5 0.803 2.390 
6 0.689 2.582 
7 0.324 3.766 
8 0.140 5.720 
9 0.096 6.930 
10 0.024 13.728 
Both VIFs and condition indexes indicate that harmful 
collinearity is not present in the regression model for 
Objective Two; therefore, the impact of collinearity on the 
regression estimates should not be harmful. 
Data Analysis 
An OLS regression model was used to determine the 
influence of variables representing certain other 
institutional characteristics on the choice of accounting 
method for endowment investments. The descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in the regression model are reported in 
Table 4.11. Dummy variables AUDITOR1, AUDITOR2, and AUDITOR3 
used to represent the four classifications of the qualitative 
variable AUDITOR, likewise REGION1, REGION2, and REGION3 are 
dummy variables for the four classifications of REGION. 
86 
TABLE 4.11 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR OBJECTIVE TWO 
(n=162) 
standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Range 
AUDITOR! 0.253 0.436 0, 1 
AUDITOR2 0.228 0.421 o, 1 
AUDITOR3 0.327 0.471 o, 1 
% 
EQUITY 50.774 15.164 0 - 87.8 
% 
REAL 2.005 4.111 0 - 35.7 
SPENDING 1.957 1.505 o, 1, ... , 4 
REGION! 0.414 0.494 0, 1 
REGION2 0.216 0. 413 0, 1 
REGION3 0.265 0.443 o, 1 
The results of the regression model for Objective Two are 
presented in Table 4.12. The joint relationship of several 
independent variables on the dependent variable is judged by 
the overall test of significance for the model. The analysis 
of variance presented in the upper portion of Table 4. 12 
indicates the regression equation is statistically significant 
at the 0.0002 level. The regression equation has a multiple 
coefficient of determination, R2, of 0.1870 and an adjusted R2 
of 0.1389, which indicates that the independent variables 
explain over eighteen percent of the variation in the choice 
of accounting method for investments. 
An individual test of hypothesis for each independent 
variable is used to determine which independent variables are 
significantly related to the choice of accounting method for 
investments. The lower portion of Table 4.12 shows that the 
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TABLE 4.12 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR OBJECTIVE TWO 
Model 
Error 
Total 
Variables 
(Expected 
Sign) 
Intercept 
AUDITOR1 
AUDITOR2 
AUDITOR3 
% EQUITY (-) 
% REAL (-) 
SPENDING 
REGION1 
REGION2 
REGION3 
DF 
9 
152 
161 
B 
Value 
-0.4729 
-o. 0111 
0.2894 
0.1032 
0.0052 
-0.0026 
0.0307 
0.3455 
0.2484 
0.2388 
Sum of 
Squares 
4.9146 
21.3631 
26.2778 
Mean 
Squares F 
0.5461 3.88 
0.1405 
Prob> F 
0.0002* 
R2 = 0.1870 
Adjusted R2 = 0.1389 
Standard 
Error 
0.1625 
0.0948 
0.1004 
0.0874 
0.0020 
0.0073 
0.0200 
0.1033 
0.1134 
0.1104 
T for H0: Prob> 
B Value= 0 ITI 
-2.910 0.0042 
-0.118 0.9066 
2.882 0.0045 
1.180 0. 2400 
2.626 0.0095* 
-0.365 0.7153 
1.537 0.1264 
3.345 0.0010 
2.190 0.0300 
2.163 0.0321 
* Significant at the 0.10 Level or Less 
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institution's spending rate policy (SPENDING) and the 
percentage of endowment funds invested in real estate (% REAL) 
are not statistically significant in the model. Institutions 
appear to invest only a nominal amount in real estate (mean 
value of 2.005%, see Table 4.11) and this may be the reason 
the variable is not significant. 
The percentage of funds invested in equity (% EQUITY) was 
significant in the model. It was suggested earlier that 
investments in equity funds may be "politically" sensitive 
because higher returns are usually produced on which the 
institutions pay no taxes; therefore, the expected sign for 
the coefficient for this variable is negative, but it was not. 
The variables used to represent political costs in the 
regression models, SIZE for Objective One and % EQUITY for 
Objective Two, were significant, but not of the expected sign. 
Institutions with higher concentrations in equity may 
experience a large difference between values reported at fair 
market value and values reported at cost and would therefore 
likely use fair market value accounting. This may be the 
reason that the variable, % EQUITY, has a positive sign. It 
does not appear that colleges and universities are affected by 
potential political costs in the same manner as for-profit 
organizations. 
As discussed earlier, dummy variables were used to 
represent the influence of AUDITOR (AUDITOR!, AUDITOR2, and 
AUDITOR3) and REGION (REGION!, REGION2, and REGION3). The 
statistical significance of qualitative characteristics, such 
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as AUDITOR and REGION, is determined through a partial "F" 
test by examining the group of dummy variables together. 
Table 4.3 (page 70) reported the descriptive information 
for the variable AUDITOR. The four classifications of auditor 
were reflected as three dummy variables in the regression 
model. The group of dummy variables for AUDITOR was 
significant in the regression model at less than the 0.10 
level (F = 2.186 using a partial "F" test). This finding is 
consistent with the chi-square test for AUDITOR presented in 
Table 4.3. Therefore, it appears that an institution's auditor 
has an influence on the choice of accounting method. 
Specifically, it appears from Table 4.3 that institutions were 
more likely to use FMV if audited by Coopers & Lybrand. 
Table 4.3 also reported descriptive characteristics for 
the variable REGION. The four classifications of region were 
represented by three dummy variables in the regression model. 
The group of dummy variables for REGION was significant in the 
regression model at less than the 0.10 level (F = 3.917 using 
a partial "F" test). This finding is also consistent with the 
results of the chi-square test in Table 4.3. The data in 
Table 4.3 indicate that institutions in the Northeast were 
more likely to use FMV than institutions in other regions. 
Region may serve as a proxy for many different influences on 
the choice of accounting methods. There are many cultural and 
economic differences between the four regions of the country, 
and it is difficult to assess accurately the causal impact of 
region on the choice of accounting method for investments. 
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As a further validation of Model 2, both legit and probit 
models were examined with the above variables. The results 
(see Appendix C) are consistent with the OLS regression model. 
The same variables that were significant under the OLS model 
were also significant for legit and probit. These findings 
provide further verification of the results stated for OLS 
regression. 
Summary for Objective Two 
In summary, the results of the overall OLS regression 
model are consistent with the general hypothesis for Objective 
Two, that the choice of accounting method for endowment 
investments by colleges and universities is influenced by 
certain other institutional characteristics. 
The results for the specific hypotheses related to the 
influence of the independent variables on the choice of 
accounting method for investments were mixed. The variables 
used to represent an institution's spending rate and the 
percentage of funds invested in real estate were not 
significant. The institution's auditor and the institution's 
location on a regional level appear to have an influence on 
the choice of accounting method. The percentage of funds 
invested in equity was significant, but did not have the 
expected sign consistent with the political costs hypothesis. 
Similar to the results for Objective One, the model did 
not explain a large amount (R2 = 0.1870, see Table 4.12) of 
the variability observed in the accounting method used by 
colleges and universities, although it was somewhat larger 
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than the amount of variability explained by the regression 
model for Objective One. 
Empirical Tests for Combined Model 
Both Objective One and Objective Two of this study 
examine the influence of certain variables on the choice of 
accounting method for endowment investments by colleges and 
universities. By combining the variables from the models for 
Objective One and Objective Two, a third model was 
constructed. The purpose of examining the Combined Model is 
to see if all variables taken together might reveal 
information not shown by the two separate models. Again, OLS 
regression was used to test this model and the regression 
assumption regarding collinearity was validated using the same 
tests used for the other two models. 
Collinearity Analysis 
Variance inflation factors and condition indexes were 
used to determine the level of collinearity in the model. 
Table 4.13 reports the variance inflation factors for the 
Combined Model. The variance inflation factors range from 
1. 0683 to 3. 2641, indicating that collinearity should not 
seriously influence the regression estimates. 
Table 4.14 reports the condition indexes. The condition 
number of 24.203 suggests reasonable weak to moderate 
relationships among the independent variables. The 
examination of variance proportions indicated that both the 
intercept (0.95) and predictor variable RETURN (0.65) load 
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highly on the principal component with the smallest 
eigenvalue. Kleinbaum et al. (1988 p. 215) suggest that 
centering the data may be helpful in situations like this. 
TABLE 4.13 
VARIANCE INFLATION FACTORS FOR COMBINED MODEL 
Variance Inflation 
Variable Factor 
Intercept 0 
TYPE 1. 5648 
SIZE 1.7190 
EFTE 2.0881 
TRET 1.3250 
DEBT/END 1.3379 
AUDITOR1 2.0415 
AUDITOR2 2.2053 
AUDITOR3 1. 9800 
% EQUITY 1. 1848 
% 
REAL 1. 0683 
SPENDING 1.1238 
REGION1 3.2641 
REGION2 2.5927 
REGION3 2.8831 
The data were centered by subtracting the mean value from the 
independent variables and the regression was recomputed with 
the transformed variables. The collinearity analysis improved 
significantly with the condition number dropping to 4.4616. 
This suggests that collinearity should not seriously influence 
the regression estimates. 
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Both VIFs and the condition indexes indicate that harmful 
collinearity is not present in the regression model for the 
Combined Model; therefore, the impact of collinearity on the 
regression estimates should not be harmful. 
TABLE 4.14 
CONDITION INDEXES FOR COMBINED MODEL 
Principal Condition 
Component Eigenvalue Index 
1 7.165 1.000 
2 1.599 2.117 
3 1.230 2.414 
4 0.990 2.690 
5 0.841 2.917 
6 0.795 3.002 
7 0.724 3.145 
8 0.680 3.245 
9 0.328 4.671 
10 0.243 5.426 
11 0.142 7.094 
12 0.122 7.648 
13 0.086 9.132 
14 0.038 13.720 
15 0.012 24.203 
Data Analysis 
An OLS regression model was used to determine the 
influence of the variables from the Combined Model on the 
choice of accounting method for endowment investments. The 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
regression model were presented in Table 4.7 and Table 4.11. 
! 
I 
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The results of the regression model for the Combined 
Model are presented in Table 4.15. The joint relationship of 
several independent variables on the dependent variable is 
judged by the overall test of significance for the model. The 
analysis of variance presented in the upper portion of Table 
4.15 indicates the regression equation is statistically 
significant at the 0.0004 level. The regression equation has 
a multiple coefficient of determination, R2, of 0.2250 and an 
adjusted R2 of 0.1512, which indicates that the independent 
variables explain over twenty percent of the variation in the 
choice of accounting method for investments. 
The individual test of hypothesis for each independent 
variable is reported in the lower portion of Table 4.15. Not 
all the variables that were significant in Model 1 and Model 
2 remained significant in the Combined Model. Specifically, 
the variables TRET and TYPE are not significant here. This 
indicates the two variables provide redundant information to 
what is already explained by other variables in the regression 
model. 
In addition, a variable which was not significant in 
Model 2, SPENDING, became significant in the Combined Model. 
This indicates that the variable SPENDING is interacting with 
other variables in the model which can occur when low to 
moderate collinearity is present. 
Using a partial "F" test, the group of dummy variables 
related to AUDITOR was significant at the 0.025 level and the 
group of dummy variables related to REGION was significant at 
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TABLE 4.15 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR COMBINED MODEL 
Model 
Error 
Total 
Variables 
(Expected 
Sign) 
Intercept 
TYPE (+) 
SIZE (-) 
EFTE (-) 
TRET (+) 
DEBT/END (+) 
AUDITOR1 
AUDITOR2 
AUDITOR3 
% EQUITY (-) 
% REAL (-) 
SPENDING 
REGION1 
REGION2 
REGION3 
OF 
14 
147 
161 
B 
Value 
-0.5686 
0.0808 
1.7E-07 
-2.2E-07 
0.0063 
-0.0039 
-0.0344 
0.2255 
0.0788 
0.0044 
-0.0055 
0.0393 
0.2939 
0.2152 
0.2247 
Sum of 
Squares 
5. 9118 
20.3660 
26.2778 
Mean 
Squares F 
0.4223 3.05 
0.1385 
Prob> F 
.0004* 
R2 = 0.2250 
Adjusted R2 = 0.1512 
Standard 
Error 
0.2267 
0.0908 
7.9E-08 
6.8E-07 
0.0110 
0.0309 
0.0961 
0.1034 
0.0877 
0.0021 
0.0074 
0.0207 
0.1073 
0.1144 
0.1125 
T for H0: Prob> 
B Value= 0 I T I 
-2.508 0.0132 
0.890 0.3749 
2.092 0.0382* 
-0.327 
0.573 
-0.125 
-0.358 
2.180 
0.899 
2.112 
-0.740 
1.903 
2.739 
1.881 
1.998 
0.7444 
0.5675 
0.9007 
0.7205 
0.0308 
0.3702 
0.0364* 
0.4602 
0.0590* 
0.0069 
0.0619 
0.0476 
* Significant at the 0.10 Level or Less 
96 
less than the 0.010 level. The signs of all the individual 
variables in the Combined Model were consistent with the two 
earlier models, with the exception of the variable DEBT/END. 
The sign of a variable with a very low level of significance 
(DEBT/END) is unstable and can change when additional 
variables are added to the model. 
As a further validation of the Combined Model, both logit 
and probit models were examined with the above variables. The 
results (see Appendix C) are consistent with the OLS 
regression model. The same variables that were significant 
under the OLS model were also significant for logit and probit 
with the exception of the variable SPENDING (0.1453 for probit 
and 0.1277 for logit). These findings provide further 
verification of the results stated for OLS regression. 
Summary for Combined Model 
In general, the results of the overall OLS regression for 
the Combined Model provide support for the influence on the 
variables identified in Model 1 and Model 2 on the choice of 
accounting method for endowment investments by colleges and 
universities. The results of the tests of significance for 
the individual independent variables were mixed. Two of the 
significant variables in earlier models were not significant 
and one variable not previously significant became so in the 
Combined Model. This indicates that some variables from Model 
1 and 2 provide somewhat redundant information and there is a 
moderate amount of collinearity among the variables. 
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Summary of Empirical Tests for All Models 
The first two models were designed to determine if 
certain factors are associated with the accounting method used 
for endowment investments. The variables selected to 
represent these factors were based on previous research in 
positive accounting theory (Model 1) and from discussions with 
representatives from higher education (Model 2) . It was 
hypothesized that these variables have an influence on the 
choice of accounting method for endowment investments by 
colleges and universities. The results of the regression 
analysis indicate that the variables in both Model 1 and Model 
2 explain a statistically significant amount of the variation 
in the accounting method used for endowment investments. The 
variables from the two models were combined into a third 
model, which was also significant in explaining the choice of 
accounting method for endowment investments. 
The results for each independent variable were mixed. 
Not all variables were significant and not all of the 
coefficients had the expected signs. The findings of this 
study and the conclusions reached are discussed further in the 
following chapter. 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, L IMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents a summary of the study, the 
conclusions reached, and the limitations of the study. Some 
recommendations for future research are also presented. 
Summary 
The choice among alternatives in accounting methods has 
received significant attention in the research literature over 
the last thirteen years. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) proposed 
a positive accounting theory that examines managers' economic 
incentives in selecting among accounting methods. The theory 
is used to explain the choice of accounting methods on the 
basis of certain institutional characteristics. 
This study represents an initial attempt to extend 
positive accounting theory research methodology to the not­
for-profit environment. In examining the choice of accounting 
method for endowment investments by colleges and universities, 
the study had three objectives. The first objective was to 
determine if the findings in positive accounting theory hold 
true for the choice of accounting method for endowment 
investments for not-for-profit colleges and universities. The 
second objective was to determine if certain other 
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institutional characteristics are associated with the choice 
of accounting method for endowment investments. The third 
objective was to provide policymakers information regarding 
accounting for long-term investments by not-for-profit 
organizations. 
Certain variables used in previous positive accounting 
theory research were not appropriate in the not-for-profit 
setting; therefore, modifications of these variables were made 
for the study, and they are as follows: The variable used to 
represent political costs concerns was the market value of the 
endowment. The variable used to represent the bonus plan 
provisions influence was the five-year average total return on 
the endowment, and the debt-to-endowment assets ratio was used 
as the variable to represent the influence of debt covenants. 
The study, in examining the choice of accounting method 
decision by managers in colleges and universities, has certain 
advantages. By examining institutions from one industry, the 
study controls for possible systematic differences that can 
occur among firms from different industries. In addition, 
because endowment funds for colleges and universities are 
reported in a separate fund group, the study reasonably 
isolated the dependent variable from other accounting method 
decisions related to the financial "bottom line." 
To test the first two objectives, two models were 
developed with the appropriate variables; the independent 
variables of interest were: 
Positive accounting theory variables 
TYPE 
SIZE 
EFTE 
Public vs private institutions 
Size of endowment 
Endowment-per-FTE 
TRET Five-year average total return 
DEBT/END = Long term debt-to-endowment 
Other institutional characteristics 
AUDITOR = Institution's auditor 
% EQUITY = Percentage invested in equity investments 
% REAL = Percentage invested in real estate 
SPENDING = Spending rate policy 
REGION = Location in one of four regions 
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A positive relationship was hypothesized between TYPE, TRET, 
and DEBT/END and the use of FMV accounting for investments and 
a negative relationship was hypothesized for SIZE, EFTE, 
% EQUITY, and % REAL and the use of FMV accounting for 
investments. No specific relationship was hypothesized for 
AUDITOR, SPENDING, and REGION. 
OLS regression was used to test the two models; both 
models were significant at the 0.01 level or less. The 
results support the general hypothesis that both groups of 
variables are statistically significant in explaining the 
choice of accounting method for endowment investments by 
colleges and universities. 
In the first model, the variables EFTE and DEBT/END were 
not statistically significant, but the coefficients were 
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consistent with the expected sign. It appears that the 
information provided by EFTE is redundant with that provided 
by other variables in the model. The relatively low level of 
debt for colleges and universities may explain the 
insignificance of the DEBT/END variable. The variables TYPE 
and TRET were statistically significant and the coefficients 
were of the expected sign. 
The variable SIZE was statistically significant, but the 
coefficient was not consistent with the expected sign. 
Political costs considerations do not appear to influence the 
choice of accounting methods in the same manner as they do for 
for-profit organizations. A "threshold" effect has been 
suggested by Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) and Bowen et al. 
(1981) where only large firms in politically sensitive or 
highly concentrated industries consider political costs, and 
therefore, colleges and universities would not be affected by 
political costs concerns. The results indicated that for 
endowment funds a "bigger is better" influence may be present. 
In the second model, the variables % REAL and SPENDING 
were not statistically significant. The low concentration of 
investments in real estate by colleges and universities may 
explain the insignificance of the % REAL variable, although 
the coefficient was of the expected sign. The spending rate 
policy of an institution, represented by the variable 
SPENDING, also was not statistically significant. It appears 
that the decision regarding the spending rate is not 
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significantly related to choice of accounting method for the 
underlying endowment investments in Model 2. 
The dummy variables used to represent AUDITOR and REGION 
were statistically significant at less than the 0.10 level. 
The variable % EQUITY was also statistically significant but 
the coefficient was not of the expected sign. Institutions 
with a large concentration in equity funds appear to prefer 
reporting investments under the FMV method, which is 
inconsistent with the relationship suggested by concentrations 
in politically sensitive investments and the threat of some 
political action. 
The Combined Model was developed by using all the 
variables from both Model 1 and Model 2. 
was statistically significant at the 
The Combined Model 
0.0004 level. The 
independent variables SIZE, %EQUITY, and the groups of dummy 
variables used to represent AUDITOR and REGION were 
statistically significant at less than the 0.025 level in the 
Combined Model as well as an earlier model. However, two of 
the independent variables significant in an earlier model, 
TYPE and TRET, were not statistically significant in the 
Combined Model. This indicates that �oth variables (TYPE and 
TRET) provide information in the model that is redundant with 
other variables. The variable SPENDING which was not 
significant in an earlier model was significant in the 
combined model. 
The coefficient signs of all the independent variables 
remain consistent with the results of the two individual 
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models, with the exception of the variable DEBT/END. Overall, 
the Combined Model explains more of the differences observed 
in accounting for endowment investments than the two 
individual models, indicating that both sets of variables have 
a significant influence on the choice of accounting method for 
endowment investments. 
The results from the three models provide information 
regarding relationships between certain institutional 
characteristics and the choice of accounting methods for 
endowment investments. This insight should be useful to 
policymakers considering the treatment of investments for not­
for-profit organizations. 
Conclusions 
The results of the three models support the association 
of certain institutional characteristics and the choice of 
accounting method in a not-for-profit environment. This 
finding is generally consistent with previous positive 
accounting theory studies [Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Ayres 
(1986), Wong (1988), Deakin (1989), and Trombley (1989)] that 
reports the influence of certain variables on the choice of 
accounting methods. Certain other institutional 
characteristics were also associated with the choice of 
accounting method. 
Positive accounting theory suggests that four factors 
influence the choice of accounting method: government 
regulations, political costs, bonus plan provisions, and debt 
covenants. Overall the results of the Model 1 provide support 
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for the influence of these variables in the not-for-profit 
environment. The effect of the individual variables is 
discussed below. 
The government regulations hypothesis suggests that 
institutions that are regulated are negatively related with 
accounting methods that increase reported income. Support for 
this hypothesis was found in studies of for-profit firms by 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Deakin (1989), and Wong (1988). 
This study found that public institutions, which face the 
possibility of some type of government action, are negatively 
related to an accounting method that reports higher returns 
and asset values. This finding provides new support for the 
influence of government regulations suggested by positive 
accounting theory. 
The political costs hypothesis suggests that relatively 
larger institutions are negatively related with accounting 
methods that increase reported income. Support for this 
hypothesis was found in studies of for-profit firms by Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978), Daley and Vigeland (1983), Ayres (1986), 
and Wong (1988). This study found that the relative size of 
an institution is positively related to an accounting method 
that reports higher returns and asset values, which is 
inconsistent with the political costs hypothesis. It appears 
that institutions are influenced by a "bigger is better" 
factor and that a "threshold" effect may also be present for 
this type of not-for-profit organization. The "threshold" 
effect is consistent with the findings of Zmijewski and 
105 
Hagerman (1981) and Bowen et al. {1981), who found that only 
large firms in politically sensitive or highly concentrated 
industries are influenced by political costs concerns. 
The bonus plan provisions hypothesis suggests that 
institutions with management bonus compensation plans are 
positively related to accounting methods that increase 
reported income. Support for this hypothesis was found in 
studies of for-profit firms by Zmijewski and Hagerman {1981), 
Dhaliwal et al. {1982), Healy (1985), Ayres {1986), and Deakin 
(1989). In studies where earnings were used to represent the 
influence of a bonus plan [Trombley (1989) and Ayres {1986)], 
managers who experienced a decline or had a relatively smaller 
percent increase in earnings were more likely to elect early 
adoption of an income increasing accounting method. This 
study found that return on investments, used to represent this 
factor, is positively related to the choice of accounting 
method that reports higher returns and asset values, which is 
consistent with the bonus plan provisions hypothesis. 
The debt covenants hypothesis suggests that institutions 
with relatively higher debt-to-equity ratios are positively 
related with accounting methods that increase reported income. 
Support for this hypothesis was found in studies of for-profit 
firms by Dhaliwal {1980), Zmijewski and Hagerman {1981), Bowen 
et al. ( 1981) , Dhaliwal et al. ( 1982) , Daley and Vigeland 
(1983), Ayres (1986), Wong (1988), Trombley {1989), and Deakin 
(1989). This study found the debt-to-endowment assets ratio, 
used to measure this factor, not to be significant. The data 
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indicate that the level of debt is significantly less for 
colleges and universities than it is for for-profit 
organizations and therefore has less influence on the choice 
of accounting method. 
In conclusion, the study supports the extension of 
positive accounting theory research methodology in the not­
for-profit environment. Model 1 was statistically significant 
in explaining the differences observed in choice of accounting 
method for endowment investments. The government regulations 
and bonus plan provisions hypotheses were supported. The 
political costs hypothesis was not supported, and size appears 
to have a different influence on the choice of accounting 
method. The debt covenants do not have a significant 
influence on choice of accounting method. 
The second model developed in the study examined the 
influence of certain other institutional characteristics on 
the choice of an accounting method for endowment investments 
by colleges and universities. These characteristics were 
identified from discussion with representatives from colleges 
and universities. Overall, the results of Model 2 provide 
support that these characteristics influence the choice of 
accounting method for endowment investments. The effects of 
the individual variables are discussed below. 
Trombley (1989) suggested that a firm's auditor may have 
an influence on the choice of an accounting method, especially 
in an industry made up of relatively small firms. Based on 
this finding, a variable was added to the study to reflect the 
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institution's auditor. The results indicate that the auditor 
effect was statistically significant for colleges and 
universities. Institutions that were audited by a "Big six" 
firm (especially Coopers & Lybrand) were more likely to use 
FMV accounting than those audited by some other firm. 
It was suggested that the composition of an institution's 
endowment may have an influence on the choice of accounting 
method. It was hypothesized that higher concentrations of 
endowment investments in "politically sensitive" assets would 
influence an institution to select an accounting method that 
would report lower r.eturns and asset values. The study found 
the opposite effect for investments in equity funds, and 
investments in real estate were not significant. Again, 
political costs concerns do not appear to have a significant 
influence on the choice of accounting method for colleges and 
universities. 
Institutions must determine a spending rate policy for 
endowment funds, which can range from spending a modest level 
(less than five percent of market value) to spending all 
income from the endowment. It was suggested that the 
institution's spending rate policy may have an influence on 
the choice of accounting method for investments. The study 
found mixed results for the influence of a spending rate 
policy. There was a significant relationship between spending 
rate policy and the choice of accounting method for endowment 
investments for the Combined Model, but not for Model 2. The 
positive sign of the coefficient indicates that institutions 
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that spend a relatively larger amount of their endowment 
earnings are more likely to use FMV accounting method for 
investments than are firms that spends a relatively smaller 
amount. 
It was suggested that the location of an institution may 
have an influence on the choice of accounting method. For 
example, institutional managers belong to related regional 
professional organizations where ideas are often exchanged, 
which may have an influence on institutional practices and 
procedures. In addition, location may serve as a proxy for 
some systematic social and economic differences among regions. 
The results of the study indicate a difference among regions 
on the choice of accounting method for endowment investments. 
In conclusion, the results of the study provide support 
for the influence of certain other institutional 
characteristics on the choice of accounting methods. 
Specifically, the institution's auditor, location, and 
concentration of investments in equity funds have a 
statistically significant influence on the choice of 
accounting methods for endowment investments. 
Limitations 
Several limitations of this study are similar to those of 
other studies in positive accounting theory. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) identified several limitations that are 
discussed below. In addition, limitations unique to this 
study are discussed. 
109 
Overall, most studies in positive accounting theory have 
relatively low explanatory values, as was the case for this 
study. Watts and Zimmerman suggest th.at this is due to 
problems with model specification, problems with specifying 
the left-hand-side and right-hand-side variables, and omitted 
variables, which are discussed below. 
Watts and Zimmerman identified two problems with the 
model specification. First, the model examines the effects of 
compensation plans, debt agreements, and the political process 
on the wealth of a manager via the choice of accounting 
method. The variables can represent both efficiency and 
opportunism on the part of management. The model interprets 
the compensation plan as only managerial opportunism. Second, 
problems with the model specification result from ignoring the 
interactive effects of the independent variables. The 
compensation plan may suggest one type of action by 
management, while the debt agreements and political process 
may suggest a different action. The model assumes the 
independent variables are additive and ignores the interactive 
effects. 
The major problem with the left-hand-side variable is the 
focus on a single method choice variable. As was explained 
earlier, managers make accounting method choice decisions as 
part of an overall reporting strategy. When the left-hand­
side variable represents only one accounting choice, the 
effect of other accounting decisions is ignored. This study 
compensates somewhat for this limitation because the endowment 
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fund is reported separately; therefore, the effect of the 
choice of accounting method is isolated from other accounting 
method decisions. 
The major problem with the right-hand-side variables is 
that the variables are not properly measured. For example, 
size, used to measure political sensitivity, may be a 
surrogate for other institutional characteristics. Debt-to­
endowment is an imprecise measurement of the effects of debt 
agreements, and prior returns is also an imprecise measure of 
management compensation. 
Possible omitted variables in the model present another 
limitation of studies in positive accounting theory. There 
may be other factors that influence managers' wealth that are 
not included in the model. One such influence, the systematic 
difference in industry, is controlled in this study because it 
examines institutions from only one industry. 
There may also be omitted variables outside the factors 
considered by positive accounting theory that have an 
influence on the choice of accounting methods. These 
variables may have no impact on the wealth of a manager but 
may be significant in explaining the choice of accounting 
method. This study examined several such variables; however, 
there may be others. 
Another limitation of this study is the potential bias 
introduced by the data gathering methods employed. The NES 
includes a majority of colleges and universities with 
significant endowments. The study's final sample represented 
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only colleges and universities from the NES that also provided 
other needed information. Furthermore, the institution must 
have responded to the questionnaire. The final sample of 162 
institutions represents forty-nine percent (162/330) of the 
institutions in the NES. Data availability constraints 
precluded a more extensive study sample. 
Finally, the data used for institutional debt were from 
fiscal year 1987-88, because the data from fiscal year 1988-89 
were not available. The results of the regression equations 
indicated that the variable DEBT/END had the least amount of 
influence on the choice of accounting method for endowment 
investments. Thus, the effect of using the institutional debt 
from 1987-88 appear to have little impact on the study. 
Recommendations 
The study provides a basis for some interesting future 
research. The study represents an initial attempt to extend 
positive accounting theory research to a choice of accounting 
method in a not-for-profit organization. The results indicate 
systematic differences in an accounting method used by 
colleges and universities and certain factors identified in 
previous positive accounting theory research. Thus, not-for­
profit institutions provide a relatively unexplored area for 
future research related to positive accounting theory. 
The not-for-profit environment provides some unique 
situations to test positive accounting theory. For example, 
in this study it was possible to reasonably isolate the 
dependent variable, choice of accounting method for endowment 
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investments, because of the use of fund accounting. There may 
be other such situations in the not-for-profit environment 
since there are several different types of not-for-profit 
organizations and several different reporting formats. 
The results of the study indicate a different effect for 
size than would be expected from the political costs 
hypothesis; there is a need for a more thorough investigation 
of the size effect in the not-for-profit environment. The 
"auditor" effect was also significant and further research is 
needed to determine the role of the auditor on accounting 
decisions in industries that are not highly concentrated. 
Investment in equity funds had significant influence on 
the choice of accounting method for endowment investments 
which indicates that the accounting method used and the 
allocation strategy of the underlying assets are related. 
Further investigations of these types of relationships may 
provide additional insight into accounting method decisions. 
Addi tiona! research is also warranted in determining the 
effect of location and spending policy on the choice of 
accounting method. 
The not-for-profit environment may also provide some 
unique situations to test for the influence of government 
regulation and the political process. This study provides one 
example of how the type of organization can influence a choice 
of accounting method. 
In addition to the variables related to positive 
accounting theory, the study included several other variables 
113 
in the examination of the choice of accounting method, 
identified from discussion with representatives from colleges 
and universities. There may be other variables that influence 
the choice of accounting methods and the variables may vary 
among the different types of not-for-profit organizations. 
Additional research is needed to determine which institutional 
characteristics have an influence on choice of accounting 
methods. 
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COPY OF COVER LETTER 
i"-J_A S l_j 8 0 
September 11, 1990 
Dear NES Participant: 
Let me first encourage you to complete the 1990 NACUBO Endowment Questionnaire that was 
sent to you a short time ago. The importance and circulation of the NACUBO Endowment Study has 
increased substantially over the last few years in large measure because of your willingness to provide 
us with your institution's endowment performance data. Thanks for your ongoing cooperation in this 
project. 
I would also ask your indulgence in answering the attached inquiry regarding the accounting 
method used to value your endowments. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) asked 
NACUBO to obtain this information right after the larger survey instrument had been mailed. I ask that 
you answer the following survey and return it directly to me at the following address: 
 
Robin Jenkins 
Financial Management Center 
 
 
 
 
If you should have any questions regarding this inquiry, please feel free to call me at  
The NES Questionnaire should be returned in the usual manner to Cambridge Associates. 
Thanks again for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
Robin Jenkins 
Enclosure 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
NACUBO 
ACCOUNTING METHOD STUDY 
ENDOWMENT FUNDS 
1. Name of i.n.>.:irution 
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2. In the institution's balance sheet, what accounting method is used to report investtnentS in the 
endowment funds? 
Fair rna!ket value 
Cost method 
Other (please specify) 
3. Is the institution required to use the above accounting method for investments by any external 
affiliation or association? 
No 
Yes _ (please specify the affiliation or association --------' 
4. Has the institution changed its accounting method for investments in the last five years? 
Yes 
No 
If a change has been made in the last five years. what accounting method was used 
before the change? ------------
S. If the institution has considered a change in accounting method for investments in the lastS years. 
please describe what methods were considered and why they were not adopted. 
6. Who audits the institution's financial statements?------------
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APPENDIX B 
List of Colleges and Universities 
LIST OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
Agnes Scott College 
University of Akron 
Albion College 
Allegheny College 
Alma College 
Amherst College 
Arizona State University 
University of Arizona 
Austin College 
Babson College 
Baldwin-Wallace College 
Barmard College 
Berea College 
Berry College 
Bethany College 
Boston University 
Bowdoin College 
Bowling Green State University 
Brandeis University 
Bryant College 
Brun Mawr College 
Bucknell University 
Buena Vista College 
Butler University 
California Institute of Technology 
California Institute of the Arts 
Canisius College 
Carleton College 
Carnegie-Mellon University 
University of Chicago 
Claremont McKenna College 
Claremont University Center 
Clarkson University 
Colby College 
Colgate University 
University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. 
Columbia University 
Connecticut College 
Cooper Union 
Cornell College 
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1989 
Endowment 
($000s) 
114,823 
33,980 
49,894 
47,785 
41,722 
266,506 
13,693 
55,300 
68,464 
24,929 
39,995 
43,969 
252,052 
60,459 
24,134 
150,547 
144,156 
25,665 
144,618 
30,657 
133,917 
87,335 
35,472 
90,847 
477,879 
24,300 
20,916 
157,632 
291,271 
973,697 
92,666 
50,603 
34,953 
7,403 
123,309 
57,356 
1,460,356 
35,581 
100,375 
22,691 
Cornell University 
Dartmouth College 
University of Delaware 
Denison University 
Depaul University 
Dillard University 
Emory University 
Fordham University 
Franklin and Marshall College 
George Washington University 
Goucher College 
Grinnell College 
Guilford College 
Hamilton College 
Hampden - Sydney College 
Hampton University 
University of Hartford 
Harvard University 
Harvey Mudd College 
Haverford College 
Hope College 
Illinois College 
Ithaca College 
Johns Hopkins University 
Juniata College 
Kalamazoo College 
Kentucky Wesleyan College 
University of Kentucky 
Knox College 
Lafayette College 
Lawrence University 
Lehigh University 
Loyola Maryrnount University 
Loyola University of Chicago 
Lynchburg College 
Madonna College 
Marietta College 
Marquette University 
Mary Baldwin College 
University of Maryland System 
Memphis State University 
Mercer University 
Michigan State University 
University of Michigan 
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1989 
Endowment 
($000s) 
823,000 
632,027 
329,280 
69,184 
34,235 
21,608 
923,612 
61,653 
78,703 
265,772 
57,490 
294,328 
20,553 
113,945 
30,339 
75,359 
24,123 
4,478,976 
63,143 
78,119 
23,766 
27,423 
56,743 
527,209 
23,441 
38,765 
3,394 
70,455 
28,019 
187,117 
69,590 
225,628 
96,558 
246,236 
23,794 
11,828 
22,258 
71,972 
16,079 
52,471 
12,429 
93,041 
51,012 
422,809 
Middlebury College 
Mills College 
University of Mississippi 
University of Missouri 
Monmouth College (New Jersey) 
Moravian College 
Muhlenberg College 
University of Nebraska 
University of Nevada System 
College of New Rochelle 
New School for Social Research 
New York University 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Northwestern University 
Norwich University 
University of Notre Dame 
Ohio Northern University 
Ohio State University 
University of Oregon Foundation 
Philadelphia College of Pharmacy & Science 
University of Pittsburgh 
Pitzer College 
Pomona College 
Princeton University 
Purdue University 
Radcliffe College 
Randolph-Macon College 
Reed College 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
University of Richmond 
Roanoke College 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
University of Rochester 
Russell Sage College 
Rutgers the State University 
Saint Louis University 
Saint Mary's College (Indiana) 
Saint Norbert College 
Saint Peter's College 
Salem College 
Santa Clara University 
Scripps College 
Simmons College 
Southern Methodist University 
Southwestern University 
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1989 
Endowment 
($000s) 
216,920 
68,275 
37,707 
131,968 
9,274 
18,001 
28,777 
155,284 
56,056 
6,924 
22,628 
540,315 
151,562 
893,680 
28,101 
542,501 
21,556 
287,298 
24,386 
48,284 
259,144 
14,222 
271,053 
2,483,829 
133,431 
91,574 
21,642 
74,528 
209,406 
265,310 
25,164 
155,630 
538,078 
8,060 
112,097 
160,779 
25,854 
18,698 
4,775 
17,387 
96,781 
56,869 
62,535 
334,643 
114,554 
The University of the South 
Spelman College 
Stanford University 
Swarthmore College 
Sweet Briar College 
Syracuse University 
Temple University 
Thomas Jefferson University 
Trinity College (Connecticut) 
Tufts University 
Tulane University 
Union College 
Utah State University 
Vanderbilt University 
Vassar College 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Virginia Tech Foundation, Inc. 
University of Virginia 
Wake Forest University 
Washburn Endowment Association 
Washington and Lee University 
Washington State University 
University of Washington 
Wayne State University 
Wellesley College 
Wells College 
Wesleyan University 
College of William and Mary 
University of Wisconsin Foundation 
College of Wooster 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
Xavier University (Cincinnati) 
Yale University 
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1989 
Endowment 
($000s) 
92,328 
46,940 
1,775,000 
304,911 
47,300 
144,015 
54,501 
185,229 
113,160 
130,666 
221,424 
95,238 
13,995 
556,567 
226,953 
53,770 
105,800 
446,476 
284,670 
33,874 
101,169 
144,697 
147,978 
39,510 
341,746 
27,050 
275,138 
73,653 
112,126 
69,210 
97,298 
19,072 
2,336,495 
APPENDIX C 
COMPARISON OF RESULTS FOR 
OLS, PROBIT, AND LOGIT 
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APPENDIX C 
Appendix C compares the results obtained from three 
multivariate procedures: OLS regression, probit, and legit. 
As described in Chapter 3, this study involves a dichotomous 
dependent variable, which violates certain assumptions of OLS 
regression. However, based on the findings of Noreen (1988) 
and Stone and Rasp ( 1991), OLS regression can still be 
effectively used in studies that have samples of less than 
200. The purpose of this comparison is to further validate 
the OLS regression models used for the data analysis. 
Table C.1 compares the results of the three multivariate 
procedures on Model 1. The coefficients and levels of 
significance for each variable are reported in the table. For 
example, the levels of significance for the variable TYPE 
were 0.0844 for OLS, 0.0911 for probit, and 0.1021 for legit. 
The same variables that were significant using OLS were also 
significant for probit. For legit, two variables (TYPE and 
TRET), had slightly higher levels of significance. 
For Model 2 and the Combined Model, probi t and log it 
could not properly converge on a solution for the dummy 
variables used to represent REGION. The data related to 
REGION in Table 4.3 indicates that one of the regions (west) 
had no occurrences of institutions using FMV accounting for 
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the dependent variable. The west and midwest regions were 
combined and all three multivariate procedures applied again. 
The results obtained for OLS using only three regions were 
similar to those reported in the study (see Tables 4.12 and 
4.15). The same variables that are significant in the OLS 
regression model used here were also significant in the model 
used in the study. Table C.2 reports the results of Model 2 
and Table C.3 reports the results of the Combined Model. 
The interpretation of the signs of the coefficients for 
the probit model is different from that of OLS and logit. For 
example, probit reports a negative coefficient for the 
variable TRET (-0.0739) in Model One: indicating that the 
probability of an institution using the cost method decreases 
as TRET increases. This interpretation is consistent with the 
positive sign for the coefficient for TRET obtained using OLS 
and logit. 
Appendix C indicates very similar results for all three 
multivariate procedures. A variable that is significant at a 
small level in the OLS model was also significant at a small 
level in probit and logit. Generally, for the variables 
identified as significant using OLS regression, the level of 
significance was slightly higher for probit and logit, which 
is consistent with the findings of Noreen (1988) and Stone and 
Rasp (1991). The comparison of the three methods supports the 
use of OLS in the study. 
Variables 
Intercept 
TYPE 
SIZE 
EFTE 
TRET 
DEBT/END 
TABLE C.1 
COMPARISON OF MODEL 1 RESULTS FOR 
OLS, PROBIT, AND LOGIT 
(-----OLS-----) (-----PROBIT-----) 
B Value 
0.1903 
0.0897 
2.2E-07 
-6.2E-07 
0.0184 
0.0026 
Prob. 
0.2383 
0.0844* 
0.0054* 
0.3651 
0.0882* 
0.9346 
B Value 
2.5922 
-0.6500 
-7.6E-07 
2.4E-06 
-0.0739 
0.0032 
Prob. 
0.0115* 
0.0911* 
0.0306* 
0.3462 
0.0937* 
0.9840 
* Significant at the 0.10 Level or Less 
(-----LOGIT-----) 
B Value 
-4.7703 
1.1973 
1.2E-06 
-4.3E-06 
0.1460 
0.0055 
Prob. 
0.0036* 
0.1021 
0.0417* 
0.3357 
0.1011 
0.9849 
1-' 
w 
1-' 
TABLE C.2 
COMPARISON OF MODEL 2 RESULTS FOR 
OLS, PROBIT, AND LOGIT 
-
(-----OLS-----) (-----PROBIT-----) 
Variables B Value Prob. B Value Prob. 
Intercept -0.2061 0. 1370 2.8236 0.0001* 
AUDITOR! -0.0331 0.7291 0.0151 0.9748 
AUDITOR2 0.2477 0.0141 -0.9985 0.0292 
AUDITOR3 0.0979 0.2700 -0.5855 0.1693 
% EQUITY 0.0051 0.0116* -0.0247 0.0120* 
% REAL -0.0020 0.7820 0.0336 0.4563 
SPENDING 0.0297 0.1441 -0.0988 0.2333 
REGION! 0.1065 0.2047 -0.3817 0.2767 
REGION2 -0.0794 0.3414 0.3803 0.3040 
* Significant at the 0.10 Level or Less 
(-----LOGIT-----) 
B Value Prob. 
-4.9647 0.0001* 
0.1647 0.8586 
1. 9013 0.0304 
1.1471 0.1762 
0.0417 0.0146* 
-0.0486 0.5152 
0.1976 0.1801 
0.5929 0.3311 
-0.7369 0.2761 
..... 
w 
N 
TABLE C.3 
COMPARISON OF COMBINED MODEL RESULTS FOR 
OLS, PROBIT, AND LOGIT 
(------OLS------) (-----PROBIT-----) (------LOGIT-----) 
Variables B Value Prob. B Value Prob. B Value Prob. 
Intercept -0.3306 0.1290 3.5868 0.0011* -6.4176 0.0026* 
TYPE 0.0921 0.3160 -0.4465 0.3097 0.7478 0.3481 
SIZE 1.9E-07 0.0166* -8.3E-07 0.0475* 1.4E-06 0.0580* 
EFTE -4.9E-07 0.4758 3.1E-06 0.3014 5.4E-06 0.3061 
TRET 0.0054 0.6241 -0.0374 0.4618 0.0762 0.4533 
DEBT/END -0.0008 0.9788 0.0748 0.7859 -0.1461 0.7679 
AUDITOR! -0.0526 0.5874 0.0278 0.9557 0.1776 0.8533 
AUDITOR2 0.1911 0.0656 -0.8801 0.0715 1. 7389 0.0630 
AUDITOR3 0.0745 0.4019 -0.5576 0.2070 1.1584 0.1863 
% EQUITY 0.0045 0.0348* -0.0227 0.0330* 0.0378 0.0421* 
%REAL -0.0052 0.4861 0.0843 0.1308 -1.4610 0.1669 
SPENDING 0.0367 0.0800* -0.1316 0.1453 0.2480 0.1277 
REGION! 0.0831 0.3251 -0.2649 0.4674 0.3744 0.5570 
REGION2 -0.0578 0.4914 0.3777 0.3587 -0.6874 0.3190 
* Significant at the 0.10 Level or Less ..... 
w 
w 
VITA 
